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Substantial Being in Aristotle’s Biology 
I. Introduction 
This is a study of substantial being and the role it plays in Aristotle’s biology. Substantial 
being in the biological context can, as an analytic first pass, be defined as the essence or what it 
is to be an animal of a certain kind. According to the framework I develop, substantial being 
plays two major roles. The first of these is explanatory, particularly within the method of 
division. This method, sketched out by Plato in the so-called “late” dialogues, is discussed in 
detail in two works, the Parts of Animals and Posterior Analytics. The idea in Plato is that by 
taking a general kind and making two mutually incompatible divisions, we can reach the essence 
of something. Aristotle wrestled with this Academic legacy, and what we find in his work, on my 
account, constitutes a radical critique and reworking of it from the foundations. In chapter II of 
this essay I look at the negative critique and groundwork for Aristotle’s positive vision in the 
first chapter of the Parts of Animals, and in chapter III I turn to the Posterior Analytics for a 
positive model. Not only does Aristotle’s own account of the method of division make good 
sense of his scientific practice, it also is coherent with and, once interpreted at the correct level of 
abstraction, explicated by the account of division in his Posterior Analytics. Once I have outlined 
Aristotle’s method of division, I will discuss, in chapters IV-V, what substantial being is 
ontologically speaking, by turning to the De Anima and Metaphysics respectively, and will argue 
that it is identical to the soul of an animal, which is itself equivalent to the substance of an 
animal. In Chapter VI, I will challenge my findings with the doctrine of animal parts as presented 
in a passage in the Politics and look at how explanation functions in a couple of actual cases 
from the Parts of Animals. If my task succeeds, we will end with a fuller picture of the work 
substantial being does in the biological context.1 
A controversial aspect of my methodology is an underlying willingness to understand the 
biology in light of treatises from the Organon and remainder of the corpus. However, 
understanding Aristotle’s scientific practice in the biological treatises as an extension of the 
methodology presented in the Posterior Analytics is, to put it mildly, a controversial move.2 If 
we can show, however, that looking at the treatises together creates a richer and philosophically 
                                                 
1 My study is indebted to the canvassing of the biological data on substantial being in Gotthelf 2012, 217-241. 
2 See for contrast the developmentalist model—on which the biological treatises such as the Parts of Animals and 
Posterior Analytics represent different phases in Aristotle’s thinking—advocated in Lloyd 1996a and 1996b. 
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more coherent explanation, that gives prima facie evidence for considering them in conjunction. 
What’s more, the various indicators and cross references to other works throughout the 
Aristotelian corpus provide an obvious sign that Aristotle intended the claims from one treatise 
to at a minimum be in conversation with those of another. Aristotle’s texts on nature, for 
example, can be taken as a whole to form a complete system; the foundations of sublunary 
physics are laid out in a way which gives the physical and conceptual foundations for the natural 
world in On Generation and Corruption.3 What’s more, if we are to take the Posterior Analytics 
seriously at all as a model for science and take its own employment of examples from natural 
science as meaningful, then the points of agreement or divergence between its theory and 
scientific praxis must be addressed. I will argue that taking both treatises together will give us 
the best, and a more illuminating, account of Aristotle on division.4 Understanding the 
Metaphysics as in line with the biology is less controversial than the Posterior Analytics case, but 
it has still been contested.5 Again, my view is that Aristotle’s corpus becomes substantially less 
interesting if we deny that the very same concepts which are deployed in multiple treatises are 
somehow unrelated—nor do I find the “metaphysical” Aristotle a different thinker than the 
scientific Aristotle enough to conjecture a development or change in his thought with confidence. 
II. Problems with Division in the Parts of Animals 
In the first book of Aristotle’s Parts of Animals, Aristotle programmatically lays out a 
method of division to be employed in the empirical investigations which occupy the rest of the 
treatise. In this context, Aristotle asks whether we ought to “take each substantial being singly 
and define it independently, e.g., taking up one by one the nature of mankind, lion, ox, and any 
other animal as well; or should one first establish, according to something common, the attributes 
common to all?” (PA I.1, 639a15-20)6. Examples of these common attributes are respiration, 
sleep, growth, and death of living beings. Aristotle claims that it would be absurd to go through 
these species by species, when they are commonalities and can be discussed more efficiently at a 
higher level of generality. There are, however, he says, important differences in “form,” 
including in the “locomotion of animals” as well as in “natural generation” (639b1-15). Despite 
the lucidity with which Aristotle sets out this initial framework, there are several interpretive 
                                                 
3 See Burnyeat 2004 
4 See also Lennox 2001 for further explorations of the continuities between the An Post. and the PA model. 
5As developed in Lloyd 1991 
6 Translations of PA modified from Lennox 2003 
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problems modern readers face in understanding Aristotle’s account. These consist both in 
comprehending what methodological requirements exactly he is arguing for in the first book and 
in determining whether or not these requirements are actually followed in the biological 
explanations that compose the remaining books the Parts of Animals. Despite Aristotle’s own 
reliance on the method of division, he is critical of the alternative, Academic methodology 
employed by those who 
attempt to grasp the particular by dividing the kind into two differences. But this is in one respect not easy, 
and in another impossible. For of some things there will be only one difference, the others being 
superfluous, e.g. footed, two-food, split-footed; this single difference is decisive. Otherwise, it will be 
necessary to say the same things many times (PA I.2, 642b5-10).  
Indeed, Aristotle musters a series of powerful, though often obscure, criticisms against the 
method of dichotomy: 
Further, one should avoid tearing each kind apart, e.g. putting some of the birds in one division and 
some in the other, as the written divisions have done; there, some of the birds end up divided off 
with the water-dwellers, some in another kind. Now this similarity has an established name, ‘bird’, 
and another has ‘fish’. Other similarities are nameless, e.g. the blooded and the bloodless; there is 
no one established name for either of these. If, then, nothing alike in kind should be torn apart, 
division into two is worthless. For people who divide in this manner necessarily separate and tear 
apart; some of the many-footed things are among the land-dwellers, while some are among the 
water-dwellers7 (PA I.2 642b10-20). 
Division must respect certain previously given kinds; however, the Academic target of the 
polemic here does not respect these divisions. The standard here will be made explicit later; any 
division which does not respect the data, that some animals clearly have certain likenesses which 
form a kind, has gone badly wrong somewhere. Aristotle is not willing to restrict this principle, 
however, to those kinds which are already established; newly discovered kinds, like blooded and 
bloodless are also going to be kinds which should not be divided. But dichotomy inherently 
cannot respect such categorizations, “tearing apart” these kinds—whether they are provided by 
folk belief, like birds and fish, or not antecedently named. What this suggests is that the kinds 
Aristotle is interested in are not merely linguistic construction, but are found by empirical 
                                                 
7 Ἔτι δὲ προσήκει μὴ διασπᾶν ἕκαστον γένος, οἷον τοὺς ὄρνιθας τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῇδε, τοὺς δ’ ἐν ἄλλῃ διαιρέσει, καθάπερ 
ἔχουσιν αἱ γεγραμμέναι διαιρέσεις· ἐκεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν μετὰ τῶν ἐνύδρων συμβαίνει διῃρῆσθαι, τοὺς δ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει. 
Ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν τῇ ὁμοιότητι ὄρνις ὄνομα κεῖται, ἑτέρᾳ δ’ ἰχθύς. Ἄλλαι δ’ εἰσὶν ἀνώνυμοι, οἷον τὸ ἔναιμον καὶ τὸ 
ἄναιμον· ἐφ’ ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ τούτων οὐ κεῖται ἓν ὄνομα. Εἴπερ οὖν μηδὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν διασπαστέον, ἡ εἰς δύο 
διαίρεσις μάταιος ἂν εἴη· οὕτως γὰρ διαιροῦντας ἀναγκαῖον χωρίζειν καὶ διασπᾶν·τῶν πολυπόδων γάρ ἐστι τὰ μὲν ἐν 
τοῖς πεζοῖς τὰ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐνύδροις. 
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research. This suggests that something deeper is going on than merely respecting the categories 
of folk belief, but that the dichotomist has missed the very phenomenon he intended to explain, 
the kinds of animals. Aristotle continues, however, to criticize the dichotomist, as he will 
throughout the first book of PA. For another issue is that the dichotomist cannot correctly divide 
by privation: 
Again, it is necessary to divide by privation, and those who dichotomize do so divide. But there is 
no difference within a privation as a privation; for there cannot be forms of what is not, e.g. forms 
of footlessness or winglessness, as there are of winged or footed; and there must be forms of a 
general difference; for if this were not the case, why would it be general rather than particular? And 
some differences are general and have forms, e.g. wingedness—one wing is unsplit, the other split. 
In the same way too one form of footedness has many splits, another two, like the cloven-hoofed 
animals, and another is unsplit and undivided, like the solid-hoofed animals. So it is difficult to 
distribute animals even into such differences as these, of which there are forms, so that any given 
animal belongs in them and the same animal does not belong in more than one, e.g. in both winged 
and wingless (For the same animal is both of these, e.g. ant, glow-worm, and certain others)8 
(642b20-33). 
The issue here is that once we have divided into categories, say blooded and bloodless, we can 
divide the blood into different sorts, if pressed, but animals cannot lack blood in a way that can 
be further divided, however else they may differ. And to lack blood is not a formal attribute of 
the kind the dichotomists require for their picture. For by dividing dichotomously they are 
supposed to end up at some last form, which is the essence of a thing. But if dichotomists, as 
they must, divide by privation, then they end up with an essence which is actually nothing. It is 
“particular,” τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον, rather than “general,” τῶν καθόλου since there is no form on 
which we can universalize, and, as Aristotle says, we must find the “form of the general 
difference.” But since a privation, as a privation, is a particular, it cannot generalize and perform 
the work a definition must. In addition, the simple binary of, say, split and unsplit wing, or 
cloven and solid hoof, fail to respect the actual complexity found in the animal world. It also 
                                                 
8 Ἔτι στερήσει μὲν ἀναγκαῖον διαιρεῖν, καὶ διαιροῦσιν οἱ διχοτομοῦντες. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ στερήσεως ᾗ στέρησις· 
ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἴδη εἶναι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον τῆς ἀποδίας ἢ τοῦ ἀπτέρου ὥσπερ πτερώσεως καὶ ποδῶν. Δεῖ δὲ τῆς 
καθόλου διαφορᾶς εἴδη εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται, διὰ τί ἂν εἴη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον; Τῶν δὲ διαφορῶν 
αἱ μὲν καθόλου εἰσὶ καὶ ἔχουσιν εἴδη, οἷον πτερότης· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄσχιστον τὸ δ’ ἐσχισμένον ἐστὶ πτερόν. Καὶ ποδότης 
ὡσαύτως ἡ μὲν πολυσχιδής, ἡ δὲ δισχιδής, οἷον τὰ διχαλά, ἡ δ’ ἀσχιδὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, οἷον τὰ μώνυχα. Χαλεπὸν μὲν 
οὖν διαλαβεῖν καὶ εἰς τοιαύτας διαφορὰς ὧν ἔστιν εἴδη, ὥσθ’ ὁτιοῦν ζῷον ἐν ταύταις ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ἐν πλείοσι 
ταὐτόν, οἷον πτερωτὸν καὶ ἄπτερον (ἔστι γὰρ ἄμφω ταὐτόν, οἷον μύρμηξ καὶ λαμπυρὶς καὶ ἕτερά τινα). 
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threatens to cleave apart the unity of animal kinds, by dividing, say, ants, into two sorts of 
beings, the winged and unwinged. 
This point is developed by Aristotle into a difficult passage which continues the critique 
of dichotomizing and is interesting for Aristotle’s own, alternative method: 
To distribute animals into bloodless differences is most difficult of all, or impossible. For it is 
necessary that each of the differences belong to one of the particulars, and so too its opposing 
difference. Yet if it is impossible for some indivisible and unitary form of substantial being to belong 
to animals that differ in form—rather, the form will always have a difference, as bird differs from 
mankind (for their two-footedness is other and different)—then even if they are blooded, either their 
blood is different, or blood should be reckoned as no part of their substantial being. If this is how it 
is, one difference will belong to two animals. And if this is the case, it is clearly impossible for a 
privation to be a difference (642b33-a7).9 
The point gets off the ground by assuming that, if we are using the method of dichotomy, then 
each difference and its opposition ends up giving us different particulars, as in the example of 
wings and winglessness. But if we divide by dichotomy, then either we end up saying that two 
animals are exactly the same, since we ended up our process of differentiating in the same place 
of each, or no two animals can have the same “indivisible and unitary form of substantial being,” 
but they will always have some sort of difference, as in the argument that there is a different 
“two-footedness” in human beings and in non-human animals. Therefore, according to the 
dichotomist, an animal that is blooded must be distinguishable on the level of blood—the blood 
must be “other and different,” or else it cannot be part of their substantial being at all, on pain of 
the two forms being indistinguishable according to the dichotomist. Aristotle goes on 
problematically, however, claiming that if this is the case, then “one difference will belong to 
two animals.” If it turned out to be true that either blood is, since it is common and not 
differentiated for each animal, or it could  always be differentiated into multiple kinds of blood, 
then the dichotomist could appropriately differentiate animals. But if the dichotomist accepts 
either of these apparent solutions, then he has trapped himself—he has himself admitted that 
general terms, which apply to multiple animals, must either not be suitable for division or be 
specifiable at higher levels of specificity. But privation, by stipulation, can never be elaborated in 
                                                 
9 Πάντων δὲ χαλεπώτατον ἢ ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα. Ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τῶν καθ’ἕκαστον ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῶν 
διαφορῶν ἑκάστην, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ἀντικειμένην. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται τοῖς εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ὑπάρχειν εἶδός τι τῆς οὐσίας 
ἄτομον καὶ ἕν, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ διαφορὰν ἕξει οἷον ὄρνις ἀνθρώπου· ἡ διποδία γὰρ ἄλλη καὶ διάφορος· κἂν εἰ ἔναιμα, τὸ αἷμα 
διάφορον, ἢ οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας τὸ αἷμα θετέον· εἰ δ’ οὕτως ἐστίν, ἡ μία διαφορὰ δυσὶν ὑπάρξει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι 
ἀδύνατον στέρησιν εἶναι διαφοράν. 
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this way, since it is impossible for there to be “different forms” of bloodlessness. Aristotle 
himself, since he is not a dichotomist, need not claim that it is true that blooded animals must 
have different blood or that it is not part of their substantial being—in fact, as we shall see, he is 
perfectly comfortable arguing that it is. Purely on a syntactic level, the κἂν should tip us off that 
Aristotle is using counter-factual reasoning; even if, if (the second εἰ) a being is bloodless, we 
agree with the dichotomist there are further differences, it presents no salvation. The next 
passage is textually corrupt and difficult to understand:10 
The differences will be equal in number to the indivisible animals, if, that is, both the animals and 
the differences are indivisible, and there is no common difference. But if it is possible for something 
common to be present as well, yet not be indivisible, it is clear that, at least in respect of that common 
feature, animals that are different in form are in the same form. Therefore, it is necessary, if the 
differences into which all the indivisible animals fall are distinctive, that none of the differences be 
common. Otherwise animals that are different will end up with the same difference. But the same 
indivisible animal should not go first into one and then into another difference within divisions, nor 
should different animals go into the same one, and all should go into them somewhere (643a7-15)11. 
If we divide into individual animals—understood not as particular animals (like this dog), but as 
the species—through division, then we will finally end up with a number of successful divisions 
equivalent to the number of animals. What Aristotle considers here is common attributes—
exactly like the common form of substantial being mentioned above. An example would be 
blood, if we do not accept that either blood is individuated in beings or not part of substantial 
being. But if we employ the method of dichotomy, we end up concluding that any two beings 
without indivisible properties are the same; so, we will conclude that, due to the shared features, 
animals which are different are in fact the same. Another option would be to merely arbitrary 
shuffle animals which are indivisible into various parts of a dichotomous schema—but for 
Aristotle this state of affairs is intolerable enough to doom the entire endeavor. 
If one is going to divide via dichotomy, every given animal should have a stable place in 
the system. If we understand both of these passages as posing two horns of a dilemma for the 
dichotomist, the former arguing that if commonalities are denied the dichotomist picture fails, 
                                                 
10 I accept the textual emendation offered in Lennox 2003, 158-159 
11 Ἔσονται δ’ αἱ διαφοραὶ ἴσαι τοῖς ἀτόμοις ζῴοις, εἴπερ ἄτομά τε ταῦτα καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ ἄτομοι, κοινὴ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν. 
Εἰ δ’ ἐνδέχεται μὴ ὑπάρχειν καὶ κοινήν, ἄτομον δέ, δῆλον ὅτι κατά γε τὴν κοινὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν, ἕτερα ὄντα τῷ 
εἴδει ζῷα. Ὥστ’ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ ἴδιοι αἱ διαφοραὶ εἰς ἃς ἅπαντα ἐμπίπτει τὰ ἄτομα, μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι κοινήν. Εἰ δὲ 
μή, ἕτερα ὄντα εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν βαδιεῖται. Δεῖ δ’ οὔτε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἄτομον εἰς ἑτέραν καὶ ἑτέραν ἰέναι διαφορὰν τῶν 
διῃρημένων, οὔτ’ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ἕτερα, καὶ ἅπαντα εἰς ταύτας. 
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the latter that even if these attributes are admitted, the picture remains unsustainable. Aristotle 
continues his critique with another objection: 
Apparently, then, it is impossible to grasp the indivisible forms by dividing in the way that those 
do who divide animals—or any other kind—into two. For even on their account the final 
differences must be equal in number to all the animals that are indivisible in form. For instance, if 
there is a certain kind, of which shades of white are the first differences, and of each of them there 
are other differences, and so down to the invisibles, the final differences will be four or some other 
quantity achieved by doubling from one; and the forms will also be that many. And the form is the 
difference in the matter; for no part of an animal exists without matter, nor is it matter alone; 
neither will a body in any condition whatsoever be an animal, nor will any of its parts, as has been 
said repeatedly12 (643a15-26). 
The point here is that if we continue to divide without an end point, and every apparent 
difference is taken as suitable for division, we in fact do not end up with differentiae at the level 
of substantial being, but far below it. In the toy example Aristotle uses, differentiating even 
colors at a sufficiently fine-grained level will bottom out not in a color but in an “invisible.” And 
so, if we continue to make differentiations of animals we end up not with macroscopic objects 
like animals or even their parts, but simple pieces of matter. 
This line of reasoning also gives us insight into what would be a requirement for 
Aristotle’s own method, which is one that presumably dichotomists will endorse, namely that 
whatever explanatory role division plays, it better end up giving us the species—or rather, on my 
argument, substantial being—of every species of animal. There follows a second critique of the 
dichotomous method of division, introduced after Aristotle has given his own account: 
That it is impossible to grasp any of the forms of the particulars by dividing the kind into two, as 
some thought could be done, is apparent from the following points as well. It is impossible for there 
to be a single difference of the divided particulars, whether one takes simple or interwoven 
differences. I call a difference simple if it has no difference, e.g. split-footed, and I call it interwoven 
if it has a difference, as multi-footed is related to split-footed. For the continuity of the differences 
derived from the kind according to its division means just this, that the whole is a single thing. But 
                                                 
12 Φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὰ ἄτομα εἴδη ὡς διαιροῦνται οἱ εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες τὰ ζῷα ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν 
γένος. Καὶ γὰρ κατ’ ἐκείνους ἀναγκαῖον ἴσας τὰς ἐσχάτας εἶναι διαφορὰς τοῖς ζῴοις πᾶσι τοῖς ἀτόμοις τῷ εἴδει. Ὄντος 
γὰρ τοῦδέ τινος γένους, οὗ διαφοραὶ πρῶται τὰ λευκά, τούτων δ’ ἑκατέρου ἄλλαι, καὶ οὕτως εἰς τὸ πρόσω ἕως τῶν 
ἀτόμων, αἱ τελευταῖαι τέτταρες ἔσονται ἢ ἄλλο τι πλῆθος τῶν ἀφ’ ἑνὸς διπλασιαζομένων· τοσαῦτα δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη. 
Ἔστι δ’ ἡ διαφορὰ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ. Οὔτε γὰρ ἄνευ ὕλης οὐδὲν ζῴου μόριον, οὔτε μόνη ἡ ὕλη· οὐ γὰρ πάντως ἔχον 
σῶμα ἔσται ζῷον, οὐδὲ τῶν μορίων οὐδέν, ὥσπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται. 
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the mode of expression makes it seem that the final one alone is the difference, e.g. ‘multi-split-
footed’ or ‘two-footed’, and that ‘footed’ and ‘many-footed’ are superfluous13 (643b26-36). 
The point Aristotle makes here is that the sorts of differences that the dichotomist uses cannot be 
suitable for identifying animals. There are two sorts of differences he references in this portion of 
the argument, which are apparently meant to be exhaustive. The difference between what is 
“simple” or “interwoven” is unclear, but it seems that multiple differentiae can interact; 
something can be split-footed and multi-footed, and if the former is taken as explanatorily basic 
and the latter as a differentia of that, it becomes complex. In this way, the multiple differences 
are interrelated into one. But Aristotle argues the following: 
That there cannot be many such differences is clear; for by proceeding continuously one arrives at 
the last difference, though not at the final difference and the form. This last difference is either split-
footed alone, if one is dividing mankind, or the entire complex, e.g. if one were to combine footed, 
two-footed, and split-footed. And if mankind were split-footed alone, by proceeding in this way one 
might arrive at this single difference. But since mankind is not merely split-footed, it is a necessity 
that there be many differences that are not under a single division. There cannot, however, be many 
differences under a single dichotomous division—at least not of the same thing. Rather, one must 
end with one difference according to each division. So it is impossible for those who divide in two 
to grasp any of the particular animals14 (644a1-11). 
Aristotle here argues that although this method may reach a singular “last” differentia, it will not 
be the “final” differentia, which is connected to the form of an animal. It will either be a given 
last differentia, using the framework above, or a complex differentia chain, as in the 
“interwoven” difference. The issue here is that even a difference like this cannot possibly give 
the form of an entire animal; after all, people are not only split-footed. Nor are they primarily 
split-footed; it would be absurd to give that as the most important fact about a human being. But 
if the division is supposed to help us understand what a human being is, as I shall argue in the 
                                                 
13 Ὅτι δ’ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον εἰδῶν λαμβάνειν οὐδὲν διαιροῦσι δίχα τὸ γένος, ὥσπερ τινὲς ᾠήθησαν, καὶ 
ἐκ τῶνδε φανερόν. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ μίαν ὑπάρχειν διαφορὰν τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον διαιρετῶν, ἐάν τε ἁπλᾶ λαμβάνῃ ἐάν τε 
συμπεπλεγμένα λέγω δὲ ἁπλᾶμέν, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ διαφοράν, οἷον τὴν σχιζοποδίαν, συμπεπλεγμένα δέ, ἐὰν ἔχῃ, οἷον τὸ 
πολυσχιδὲς πρὸς τὸ σχιζόπουν. Τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ συνέχεια βούλεται τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν διαφορῶν ὡς 
ἕν τι τὸ πᾶν ὄν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν συμβαίνει δοκεῖν τὴν τελευταίαν μόνην εἶναι διαφοράν, οἷον τὸ πολυσχιδὲς ἢ τὸ 
δίπουν· τὸ δ’ ὑπόπουν καὶ πολύπουν περίεργα. 
14 Ὅτι δ’ ἀδύνατον πλείους εἶναι τοιαύτας, δῆλον· ἀεὶ γὰρ βαδίζων ἐπὶ τὴν ἐσχάτην διαφορὰν ἀφικνεῖται, ἀλλ’ οὐκ 
ἐπὶ τὴν τελευταίαν καὶ τὸ εἶδος. Αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ σχιζόπουν μόνον, ἢ πᾶσα ἡ σύμπλεξις, ἐὰν διαιρῆται ἄνθρωπον, 
οἷον εἴ τις συνθείη ὑπόπουν, δίπουν, σχιζόπουν. Εἰ δ’ ἦν ὁ ἄνθρωπος σχιζόπουν μόνον, οὕτως ἐγίγνετ’ ἂν αὕτη μία 
διαφορά. Νῦν δ’ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη πολλὰς εἶναι μὴ ὑπὸ μίαν διαίρεσιν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν πλείους γε τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐκ 
ἔστιν ὑπὸ μίαν διχοτομίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μίαν κατὰ μίαν τελευτᾶν. Ὥστε ἀδύνατον ὁτιοῦν λαβεῖν τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον 
ζῴων δίχα διαιρουμένους. 
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next section, then it is a total failure. So there cannot be a dichotomizing division which gives the 
entire animal, or the division will be haphazard (imagine if we divided split-footed animals into 
those which are capable of speech, say, and those not; it is no longer clear by what principle we 
are dividing.) So, since it will at best give only a singular division per any given animal, we must 
reject the dichotomous method of dividing animals. 
Having given these arguments against dichotomy, Aristotle introduces requirements for 
his own methodology before explicating it in more detail. This project is already implicit, as we 
have seen in his discussion of form, but here it becomes explicit. The same is true, however, in 
reverse; the method of dichotomy will turn out to fail to meet the standards Aristotle is imposing 
for his own account, which are thus of double interest: 
Further, one ought to divide by features in a thing’s substantial being, and not by its special 
attributes, as would happen if someone were to divide figures on the ground that some have angles 
equal to two right angles, while others have angles equal to more; for having angles equal to two 
right angles is a sort of attribute of the triangle15 (643a27-30). 
The distinction drawn here is between dividing via certain features which are part of the 
substantial being of an animal, those which are “special attributes,” or intrinsic accidents, τοῖς 
συμβεβηκόσι καθ’ αὑτο. The example given is between having angles equal to two right angles; 
this is true, even essentially so, of a triangle, in the sense that any polygon with right angles 
unequal to two right angles would not be a triangle. Nevertheless, it is not in the definition of a 
triangle; it is instead a (trivial) consequence of the actual definition of a triangle. In the same 
way, if we use in our division features which are merely intrinsic accidents, then we will end up 
with a distorted view of the essence of a thing16. 
Substantial being, then, plays a central role, as it is by appeal to substantiality that we 
distinguish successful divisions, those that reach the essence, from spurious ones. As we have 
previously seen, the inability of dichotomous methods of division to grasp substantial being 
                                                 
15 Ἔτι διαιρεῖν χρὴ τοῖς ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ μὴ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι καθ’ αὑτό, οἷον εἴ τις τὰ σχήματα διαιροίη, ὅτι τὰ μὲν 
δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, τὰ δὲ πλείοσιν· συμβεβηκὸς γάρ τι τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχειν τὰς 
γωνίας. 
16 Following Lennox 2003, 161-3, which distinguishes three levels; the explanatorily and definitionally basic 
substantial being, the necessary attributes which follow incidentally, as in the example given, and merely incidental 
properties. The same passage raises a worry about how we distinguish essential and incidental properties. Presumably, 
however, the essential properties will be the most basic explanatory facts about a given being, so there is no special 
epistemological difficulty beyond general questions about explanation and theory choice in the sciences. 
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constitutes part of its failure. Not only should the features we divide by be parts of a thing’s 
substantial being, but the division must proceed according to certain principles: 
Again, one should divide by opposites. For opposites are different form one another, e.g. paleness 
and darkness, straightness and curvature. So if one of the two is a difference, one should divide by 
its opposite and not in the one case by swimming and in the other by color17 (643a31-34). 
Aristotle will divide in a given string of differentiae only by attributes which are properly 
opposite to each other. This is opposed to the dichotomist, who must apparently divide by 
features which are unrelated; the picture itself does not require division by dichotomy itself, 
since the scope is restricted to the occasions on which we make differentiations of a given 
differentia. If we are, for instance, dividing via color (itself not a good candidate for inclusion in 
the substantial being of an animal), we would divide by different colors, not by two unrelated 
attributes, as swimming and color. The dichotomist, however, unless they are willing to argue 
that an animal is a single simple differentia, as Aristotle has previously pointed out, will be 
forced to divide by contingent factors: 
Moreover, ensouled things, at least, should not be divided by the common functions of the body and 
of the soul, e.g. in the aforementioned divisions, walkers and flyers; there are certain kinds to which 
both differences belong and that are flyers and wingless, just like the ant kind. Nor should these 
kinds be divided into wild and tame; for in the same way this would seem to divide forms that are 
the same. For in a manner of speaking everything that is tame is also wild, e.g. human beings, horses, 
cattle, Indian dogs, pigs, goat, and sheep. Each of these kinds, if homonymous, has not been divided 
apart, and if these are one in form, wild and tame cannot be a difference. Speaking generally, this is 
a necessary result of dividing any sort of difference by a single division
18
 (643a35-b9). 
This passage is textually very difficult.19 The point seems to be that the dichotomous method of 
division does not give us the correct results in difficult cases, like ants, which seem to 
possessmultiple functions of progression. This would be very problematic if it meant that we are 
not to divide at all by functions, as we shall see when we reach specific examples, but the 
juxtaposition of this point with a criticism of the wild/tame dichotomy seems to be that certain 
                                                 
17 Ἔτι τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις διαιρεῖν. Διάφορα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τἀντικείμενα, οἷον λευκότης καὶ μελανία καὶ εὐθύτης καὶ 
καμπυλότης. Ἐὰν οὖν θάτερα διάφορα ᾖ, τῷ ἀντικειμένῳ διαιρετέον καὶ μὴ τὸ μὲν νεύσει τὸ δὲ χρώματι. 
18 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τά γ’ ἔμψυχα τοῖς κοινοῖς ἔργοις τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, οἷον καὶ ἐν ταῖς ῥηθείσαις νῦν 
πορευτικὰ καὶ πτηνά· ἔστι γάρ τινα γένη οἷς ἄμφω ὑπάρχει καὶ ἔστι πτηνὰ καὶ ἄπτερα, καθάπερ τὸ τῶν μυρμήκων 
γένος. Καὶ τῷ ἀγρίῳ καὶ τῷ ἡμέρῳ διαιρεῖσθαι· ὡσαύτως γὰρ ἂν δόξειε ταὐτὰ εἴδη διαιρεῖν. Πάντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὅσα 
ἥμερα καὶ ἄγρια τυγχάνει ὄντα, οἷον ἄνθρωποι, ἵπποι, βόες, κύνες ἐν τῇ Ἰνδικῇ, ὕες, αἶγες, πρόβατα· ὧν ἕκαστον, εἰ 
μὲν ὁμώνυμον, οὐ διῄρηται χωρίς, εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἓν εἴδει, οὐχ οἷόν τ’ εἶναι διαφορὰς τὸ ἄγριον καὶ τὸ ἥμερον. Ὅλως δ’ 
ὁποιονοῦν διαφορᾷ μιᾷ διαιροῦντι τοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον. 
19 I accept the rendition of Lennox 2003, 163-164 
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terms which are useful to the dichotomizer either are not sufficiently exhaustive, as the ant’s 
subversion of a simple walker/flyer dichotomy makes clear, or not natural divisions at all, as 
Aristotle shows in his critique of “wild” and “tame” as natural categories. The point does not 
seem to be that they are absolutely useless, but that “tame” and “wild” cannot be themselves 
divided apart as the dichotomist needs. If they have any value for the natural scientist, then this 
falls apart when they themselves are subjected to further divisions.20 The “this” that is a 
necessary result of dichotomous division is everything that has been discussed—that in general 
division will, on the dichotomizer’s account, become totally impossible. 
Once Aristotle makes the requirements his own account is to satisfy clear, Aristotle gives 
his own method of division: 
Rather, one should try to take the animals by kinds, following the lead of the many in demarcating 
a bird kind and a fish kind. Each of these has been defined by many differences, not according to 
dichotomy. For if one uses dichotomy, it is either altogether impossible to grasp something (since 
the same thing falls into many divisions and opposed things into the same division), or there will be 
only one difference, and this one, whether it is simple or the result of interweaving, will be the final 
form21 (463b9-16) 
We follow the “lead of the many” in distinguishing kinds. This is not to assume that the way the 
many talk will necessarily carve reality at the joints—after all, Aristotle is perfectly happy to say 
that certain kinds are unnamed by popular speech. But by taking from ordinary speech kinds like 
“bird” and “fish” we will not make the same mistake as the dichotomist and tear apart what is 
naturally together. This is something that the dichotomist, again, cannot do; either we will not 
find any kinds at all, since similar things can fall into separate divisions and things which are 
naturally opposed into the same kind, or we are forced to rely on a simplistic model on which 
only one difference—whether “simple” or from “interweaving,” using the language explained 
                                                 
20 Lennox 2003, 166 argues for an alternative interpretation, on which the issue is not that tame and domesticated are 
not proper differentiae, but that it is only incidentally related to being a walker or a flyer, but this hardly makes good 
sense of the second half of the argument, which seems aimed to show that domestication is not a proper attribute to 
divide by this. Against this, Lennox points out Aristotle elsewhere admits that domesticability can be a differentia; 
but it might well be a differentia which is not properly in the definition of an animal, and in any case having the 
potential to be domesticated, and dividing by this feature (which will probably be associated with more fundamental 
facts about a creature’s nature) is not the same by dividing through what is actually domesticated and not. 
21 Ἀλλὰ δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι λαμβάνειν κατὰ γένη τὰ ζῷα, ὡς ὑφήγηνθ’ οἱ πολλοὶ διορίσαντες ὄρνιθος γένος καὶ ἰχθύος. 
Τούτων δ’ ἕκαστον πολλαῖς ὥρισται διαφοραῖς, οὐ κατὰ τὴν διχοτομίαν. Οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἤτοι τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστι 
λαβεῖν (τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ εἰς πλείους ἐμπίπτει διαιρέσεις καὶ τὰ ἐναντία εἰς τὴν αὐτήν), ἢ μία μόνον διαφορὰ ἔσται, καὶ 
αὕτη ἤτοι ἁπλῆ, ἢ ἐκ συμπλοκῆς τὸ τελευταῖον ἔσται εἶδος. 
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above. Aristotle’s own method— is asserted as the “final form” of an animal. Aristotle’s own 
method, however, which we might call conjunctive, manages to avoid the same s: 
If one does not take a difference of a difference, one will necessarily make a division continuous in 
the same way that one makes an account one by conjunction. I mean the sort of thing that results by 
dividing animals into the wingless and the winged, and winged into tame and wild, or pale and dark. 
Neither tame nor pale is a difference of winged; rather, each is the origin of another difference, while 
here it is incidental. Accordingly, one should divide the one kind straight away into many, as we 
say. In addition, in this way privations will produce a difference, while in the method of dichotomy 
they will not22 (643b17-26). 
Rather than making a single division by continually taking differentiae, according to Aristotle’s 
method multiple differentiae are connected via “conjunction.”23 Multiple differentiae which are 
not themselves interrelated will be strung along on the same level of a hierarchy; if winged 
animals are divided into tame and wild, for example,24 it is not meant to be a division of 
something that is winged into a further differentia, as in split-winged, but a differentia of the 
entire animal. So, as a result of the division, one kind is itself divided into many attributes which 
together comprise a single being. 
Having laid out his criticisms of dichotomy and an outline of his own methodology, 
Aristotle proceeds to raise a difficulty for his account: 
One might be puzzled why people have not named one kind that embraces both the water-dwelling 
and flying animals, comprehending both at once by one higher name. For there are some affections 
common both to these and other animals. Nevertheless, they are correctly defined in this way. For 
those animals that differ by degree and the more and the less have been brought together under one 
kind, while those that are analogous have been kept apart. I mean, for example, that bird differs from 
bird by the more or by degree (for one has long feathers, another short feathers), while fish differs 
                                                 
22 Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ διαφορᾶς λαμβάνῃ τὴν διαφοράν, ἀναγκαῖον ὥσπερ συνδέσμῳ τὸν λόγον ἕνα ποιοῦντας, οὕτω καὶ τὴν 
διαίρεσιν συνεχῆ ποιεῖν. Λέγω δ’ οἷον συμβαίνει τοῖς διαιρουμένοις τὸ μὲν ἄπτερον τὸ δὲ πτερωτόν, πτερωτοῦ δὲ τὸ 
μὲν ἥμερον τὸ δ’ ἄγριον, ἢ τὸ μὲν λευκὸν τὸ δὲ μέλαν· οὐ γὰρ διαφορὰ τοῦ πτερωτοῦ τὸ ἥμερον οὐδὲ τὸ λευκόν, ἀλλ’ 
ἑτέρας ἀρχὴ διαφορᾶς, ἐκεῖ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Διὸ πολλαῖς τὸ ἓν εὐθέως διαιρετέον, ὥσπερ λέγομεν. Καὶ γὰρ 
οὕτως μὲν αἱ στερήσεις ποιήσουσι διαφοράν, ἐν δὲ τῇ διχοτομίᾳ οὐ ποιήσουσιν. 
23 But the invocation of conjunction introduces a further problem which will be discussed in detail, that of the unity 
of definition, as summarized by Lennox 2003, 166. The issue is in virtue of what the various differentiae are linked to 
form a unified definition. For Aristotle says that “a definition is an account that is one not by being conjoined like the 
Iliad, but by being of one thing” (Metaphysics Η.6 1045b12-12), as pointed out by Reeve 2000. The solution to this 
will be found, I will argue in parts IV and V of this paper, in Aristotle’s ontology of substantial being. 
24 Earlier I suggested that the status of "wild” and “tame” as natural terms is suspect in Aristotle; certainly the use here 
is not meant to satisfy that they will actually be used in division, but as a toy example picking up on the proposed 
differentiae the dichotomizer would use. 
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from bird by analogy (for what is feather in the one is scale in the other). But to do this in every case 
is not easy; for most animals have the same affections by analogy25 (PA I.4 644a11-23). 
Once we have a method of division at least programmatically laid out, Aristotle moves on to 
discuss what sorts of kinds we are discussing. He first considers, and rejects, a maximal kind, 
one which would embrace even seemingly disparate animals such as water-dwellers and flyers 
Although there are “some affections” common to all animals, which should also then be grist for 
the mill of division, he sees utility in keeping the categories of folk belief. Apparently, the 
standard by which we will judge which animals share a kind is that they differ “by degree and 
the more and the less,” and those that differ “analogously” are kept apart. Although Aristotle 
illustrates this with an example, that birds differ based on the nature of their feathers, the “fish 
differs from bird by analogy,” itself a difficult concept.26 The obscurity of the conceptus 
employed here do raise a serious problem27; if membership in a kind is based off of this notion, 
whether it can be understood as coherent and compelling will change our assessment of 
Aristotle’s project as a whole. What is important to take away, however is that the division into 
kinds will be based on empirical investigation about different animals. Ordinary talk is the 
beginning of investigation, but is quickly subsumed under empirical practice. The basis for these 
divisions are in the last resort particulars: 
Since it is the last forms that are substantial beings and these, e.g. Socrates and Coriscus, are 
undifferentiated in respect of form, it is necessary either to state what belongs generally first, or to 
say the same thing many times. And things that belong generally are common; for things that belong 
to many we call general. There is, however, a puzzle about which of these two should be our subject. 
On the one hand, insofar as what is indivisible in form is a substantial being, it would be best, if one 
could, to study separately the things that are particular and undivided in form—just as one studies 
mankind, so too bird; for this kind has forms. But the study would be of any one of the indivisible 
bird, e.g. sparrow or crane or something of this sort. On the other hand, insofar as this will result in 
                                                 
25 Ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις διὰ τί οὐκ ἄνωθεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι ἐμπεριλαβόντες ἅμα ἓν γένος ἄμφω προσηγόρευσαν οἱ 
ἄνθρωποι, ὃ περιέχει τά τε ἔνυδρα καὶ τὰ πτηνὰ τῶν ζῴων. Ἔστι γὰρ ἔνια πάθη κοινὰ καὶ τούτοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις 
ζῴοις ἅπασιν. Ἀλλ’ ὅμως ὀρθῶς διώρισται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. Ὅσα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τῶν γενῶν καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν καὶ 
τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, ταῦτα ὑπέζευκται ἑνὶ γένει, ὅσα δ’ ἔχει τὸ ἀνάλογον, χωρίς· λέγω δ’ οἷον ὄρνις ὄρνιθος 
διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ καθ’ ὑπεροχήν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ μακρόπτερον τὸ δὲ βραχύπτερον), ἰχθύες δ’ ὄρνιθος τῷ ἀνάλογον 
(ὃ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ πτερόν, θατέρῳ λεπίς). Τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οὐ ῥᾴδιον·τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ ζῷα ἀνάλογον ταὐτὸ 
πέπονθεν. 
26 See Henry 2014 for an explanation but also critical comments by Leunissen. What is important to my project from 
both is that analogy “of methodological importance,” insofar as it creates differentiations at the most “general level,” 
and that it tracks a real difference in Aristotle’s biology which supports realism about species. 
27 C.f. the discussion in part VI of PA I.5. 
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speaking many times about the same affection because it belongs in common to many things, in this 
respect speaking separately about each one is somewhat silly and tedious (644a23-37).28 
It is the “last forms” that are in the long runs substantial beings. The examples given, however, 
are beings like Socrates and Coriscus, and they are said to be undifferentiated in “respect to 
form.” It is puzzling how, if the forms of Socrates and Coriscus are indeed what is being 
discussed, how they could be undifferentiated in respect of form, but what is clear is that we are 
discussing not the particular attributes of Socrates or Coricus, but what they have in common, 
namely human form. It is in virtue of this shared form that we can explain “what belongs 
generally.” This will be the strategy used on a larger scale, to take the things that are “common” 
and “belong to many.” This leads to another puzzle, what should be the subject—that, individual 
beings, or the commonalities. It would be, in an unspecified sense, “best” [κράτιστον] to study 
all the things separately. The example given is “bird,” but to maintain the analogy with 
humankind, “bird” would not be studied itself, but different species and varieties of birds. But 
this option—instead of using division, merely taking detailed ornithological notes and moving 
the explanatory project along by going species by species—is rejected by Aristotle as involving 
saying the same common things multiple times. This, he claims, would be both “silly and 
tedious.” 
But what Aristotle says here concerning the reasons he has not to treat every animal 
species individually is unlikely to be satisfactory, and scholars have offered multiple solutions as 
to what sort of explanatory program the use of division actually amounts to. Lennox identifies 
the explanations thus yielded with “B-type” explanations.” According to this interpretation, since 
we know that a certain group of entities possesses a certain feature (considered so at a high level 
of generality), we can therefore infer that a particular instance of that group does too. For 
instance, all birds of prey have talons, and once I recognize that owls are birds of prey, I also 
know that they have talons.29 But as we have seen, the method of division does not simply group 
animals such as owls under one kind, in this case bird, but places animals in a multiplicity of 
                                                 
28 Ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐσίαι μέν εἰσι τὰ ἔσχατα εἴδη, ταῦτα δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀδιάφορα, οἷον Σωκράτης, Κορίσκος, ἀναγκαῖον ἢ 
τὰ καθόλου ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον εἰπεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ταὐτὸν λέγειν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. Τὰ δὲ καθόλου κοινά· τὰ γὰρ 
πλείοσιν ὑπάρχοντα καθόλου λέγομεν. Ἀπορίαν δ’ ἔχει περὶ πότερα δεῖ πραγματεύεσθαι. Ἧι μὲν γὰρ οὐσία τὸ τῷ 
εἴδει ἄτομον, κράτιστον, εἴ τις δύναιτο περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον καὶ ἀτόμων τῷ εἴδει θεωρεῖν χωρίς, ὥσπερ περὶ 
ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω μὴ περὶ ὄρνιθος· ἔχει γὰρ εἴδη τὸ γένος τοῦτο· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὄρνιθος τῶν ἀτόμων, οἷον ἢ 
στρουθὸς ἢ γέρανος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον.Ἧι δὲ συμβήσεται λέγειν πολλάκις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάθους διὰ τὸ κοινῇ πλείοσιν 
ὑπάρχειν, ταύτῃ δ’ ἐστὶν ὑπάτοπον καὶ μακρὸν τὸ περὶ ἑκάστου λέγειν χωρίς. 
29 Lennox 1999, 10 
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relationships. We can, for example, identify a kind of “lung-possessing” animals just as we can 
of birds (PA III.6 669b8-12), but to say that animals have lungs by virtue of membership in the 
lung-having kind is itself vacuous without further explanation. It is reminiscent of the infamous 
explanation of a certain elixir causing people to fall asleep by a sleep-inducing power—it adds 
nothing to our previous knowledge. Gotthelf30 makes the connection to explanatory adequacy; to 
say the same things over and over is a sign that one does not really understand at all. What’s 
more, when we establish general principles, it brings the differences into view which distinguish 
different animals and potentially form different species. But when offered at a high level of 
generality, it isn’t clear how this knowledge of similarities and differences increases the 
explanatory power of Aristotle’s science. Aristotle himself offers little help. He only speaks 
about “some cases,” which occur “whenever kinds are spoken of by people in a clearly defined 
manner and have both a single common nature and forms in them not too distant—we should 
speak in common according to kinds, like bird and fish and any other there may be that, though it 
is unnamed, embraces, like a kind, the forms within it” (644b1-7).  Our kind terms are useful 
when there is something that “embraces forms,” i.e., when we construct at a higher level of 
generality a kind-term which is either in common usage, like bird, or new, like “lung-having,” 
then we should proceed to speak at that level of generality. The provision that the forms are “not 
too distant” is difficult to understand absent context; however, the point seems to be that there is 
a relevant similarity in their nature (as yet unclarified) which allows us to make a fruitful 
division. The differences, although important, cannot be too exaggerated, or else explanation 
becomes impossible. 
III. The PA and Posterior Analytics models 
What I suggest is that the explanatory purposes to which Aristotle puts the method of 
division are best explained by the principles set out in his Posterior Analytics in which he talks 
about division. First, he defends that division has philosophical value: 
Divisions might indeed be thought to be of no use at all but to assume everything straight off—as if 
you were to make your assumptions at the beginning without a division. But it makes a difference 
which of the predicates are predicated first and which later—e.g. whether you say animal tame two-
footed or two-footed animal tame. For if every item is made up from two things, and if animal tame 
constitutes a single item, and if man (or whatever the single thing in question may be) is next made 
up from this and the difference, then you must make a division before making your postulates. 
                                                 
30 Gotthelf 2012, 202-204 
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Again, only in this way is it possible to ensure that you omit nothing in what the thing is. For if, 
when the first kind has been taken, you then take one of the lower divisions, not everything will fall 
into it. E.g. not every animal is either whole-winged or split-winged—rather, every winged animal 
is (for it is this of which this is a difference. The first difference of animal is that into which every 
animal falls; and, similarly, for everything else, both the kinds outside it and the kinds subordinate 
to it, e.g. the first difference of bird is that into which every bird falls, and of fish into which very 
fish31 (An. Post. II.13, 96b25-97a5).32 
The conception of division here, like in the Parts of Animals, is not dichotomous, but rather 
works through a series of qualities which make up a given animal. The order of this is important, 
with there being “higher” and “lower” divisions, so that when we have multiple attributes, such 
as “animal tame” and “two-footed,” it seems to be of substantial import which comes first.  This 
is because additions within a certain larger kind, such as “animal tame,” represents a further 
division in an existing kind, a division of tame animals. The order of division presented here 
starts from the very general, things which are universal, and then goes down to the particulars; a 
certain species would be the last element in this division. It also helps us to understand how 
division is explanatory; if the alternative is a list of attributes an animal has without structure, we 
do not thereby learn anything about what it primarily is, at the highest level of generality, but 
merely a list without structure. 
When we learn that something has wings and lungs, by placing it in a division with a 
certain order we are able to determine which it is primarily by taking the most general approach. 
The “first difference” is in fact the most general, and by going down we find the particular which 
distinguishes a given animal from everything else along a certain register. But by using 
commonalities, we learn not only what sort of kind we have but hat which we do not have, or 
what kinds are included in it. What’s more, it is by using these common terms and explanations 
that we can understand the particular subjects of our divisions: 
                                                 
31 Trans. modified from Barnes 1994 
32 αἱ δὲ διαιρέσεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς χρήσιμοί εἰσιν εἰς τὸ οὕτω μετιέναι· ὡς μέντοι δεικνύουσιν, εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς 
πρότερον. χρήσιμοι δ’ ἂν εἶεν ὧδε μόνον πρὸς τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι τὸ τί ἐστιν. καίτοι δόξειέν γ’ ἂν οὐδέν, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς 
λαμβάνειν ἅπαντα, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλάμβανέ τις ἄνευ τῆς διαιρέσεως. διαφέρει δέ τι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστερον 
τῶν κατηγορουμένων κατηγορεῖσθαι, οἷον εἰπεῖν ζῷον ἥμερον δίπουν ἢ δίπουν ζῷον ἥμερον. εἰ γὰρ ἅπαν ἐκ δύο ἐστί, 
καὶ ἕν τι τὸ ζῷον ἥμερον, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὅ τι δήποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἓν γινόμενον, 
ἀναγκαῖον διελόμενον αἰτεῖσθαι. Ἔτι πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν οὕτω μόνως ἐνδέχεται. ὅταν γὰρ τὸ 
πρῶτον ληφθῇ γένος, ἂν μὲν τῶν κάτωθέν τινα διαιρέσεων λαμβάνῃ, οὐκ ἐμπεσεῖται ἅπαν εἰς τοῦτο, οἷον οὐ πᾶν ζῷον 
ἢ ὁλόπτερον ἢ σχιζόπτερον, ἀλλὰ πτηνὸν ζῷον ἅπαν· τούτου γὰρ διαφορὰ αὕτη. πρώτη δὲ διαφορά ἐστι ζῴου εἰς 
ἣνἅπαν ζῷον ἐμπίπτει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστου, καὶ τῶν ἔξω γενῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτό, οἷον ὄρνιθος, εἰς ἣν 
ἅπας ὄρνις, καὶ ἰχθύος, εἰς ἣν ἅπας ἰχθύς 
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You should look at items which are similar and undifferentiated, and first seek what they all have 
in common. Then do the same again for other items which are in the same kind as the first group 
and are of the same form as one another but of a different form from the first group. When you have 
got what all these have in common, you must do the same for the remaining groups (inquiring next 
whether the times you have taken have anything in common) until you come to a single account: 
this will be the definition of the object. If you arrive not at a single account but at two or more, then 
plainly what you are seeking is not one item but several (An. Post. 97b5-15).33 
On this account, definition consists of looking at various groupings of similarities—a given 
object will be specified by one which participates in all of those larger kinds uniquely. All of 
these will be by construction shared characteristics, so that an account will consist of many 
commonalities. This is exactly what we see in the Parts of Animals story told by Aristotle; 
contrary to the method of dichotomy, the last forms are not specified by one given difference 
which is unique to them, but by the various relationships they partake of, at least in reference to 
the sorts of beings which are capable of being subjected fruitfully to the method of division. This 
is, of course, a simplified picture; at a certain level of specificity, even two particular beings like 
Cephalus and Socrates are distinct, but we have been given the proviso to look at the shared 
form. We might also think that certain animals are totally unique, and these indeed might pose a 
problem for Aristotle34, but insofar as they are being defined by the method of division it is the 
commonalities, not the individual or particular quirks, which concern us. Aristotle says as much 
in his concluding remarks on division, that “to speak separately about each of these animals as 
particulars, as we said before, will result in saying the same things many times, whenever we 
speak about all the attributes; the same attribute belongs to many animals” (PA I.5 645b10-13). 
Division, then, is a valuable explanatory purpose put in by Aristotle, then; not only have we 
arrived at an explanatory apparatus for relations of animals, but we have also found a way to 
structure them and understand them through their common attributes. 
As a test case, we can look at what Aristotle says about a humble sort of animal, the fish: 
The fish do not have distinct limbs, owing to the fact that the nature of the fish, according to the 
account of their substantial being, is to be able to swim, since nature makes nothing either 
                                                 
33 εἴδει γὰρ ἂν διέφερε τὸ τελευταῖον, τοῦτο δ’ εἴρηται μὴ διαφέρειν. Ζητεῖν δὲ δεῖ ἐπιβλέποντα ἐπὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ 
ἀδιάφορα, πρῶτον τί ἅπαντα ταὐτὸν ἔχουσιν, εἶτα πάλιν ἐφ’ ἑτέροις, ἃ ἐν ταὐτῷ μὲν γένει ἐκείνοις, εἰσὶ δὲ αὑτοῖς μὲν 
ταὐτὰ τῷ εἴδει, ἐκείνων δ’ ἕτερα. ὅταν δ’ ἐπὶ τούτων ληφθῇ τί πάντα ταὐτόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως, ἐπὶ τῶν 
εἰλημμένων πάλιν σκοπεῖν εἰ ταὐτόν, ἕως ἂν εἰς ἕνα ἔλθῃ λόγον· οὗτος γὰρ ἔσται τοῦ πράγματος ὁρισμός. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ 
βαδίζῃ εἰς ἕνα ἀλλ’ εἰς δύο ἢ πλείους, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἕν τι εἶναι τὸ ζητούμενον, ἀλλὰ πλείω. 
34 Though they might just turn out to be monsters 
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superfluous or pointless. And since they are blooded in virtue of their substantial being, it is on 
account of being swimmers that they have fins, and on account of not being land-dwellers they do 
not have feet; for the addition of feet is useful in relation to movement on land (PA IV.13 695b17-
25).35 
The “nature of the fish,” on account of their “substantial being,” is to be able to swim, and it is 
also because of their substantial being that they are blooded. That is to say, the nature of fish here 
combines two essential features—being able to swim—and being blooded. The objection is 
raised, however, against this method of division that it makes a feature of substantial being 
“common;” that is to say, it belongs to every fish, not only one, but also to many other beings; 
birds, for example, are also blooded in their substantial beings, as are mammals.36 But not only is 
this objection ill-founded on the Posterior Analytics view, it is also so on the interpretation of the 
Parts of Animals account I put forward. That is not to say that there is a conjunction lacking 
internal structure—although there is not a formal account of fish in the Posterior Analytics style, 
presumably one could be made to make clear the relationship between being blooded and 
swimming in the substantial being of a fish. We learn that fish have a being of this kind based on 
empirical observations.37 This is not to say that everything about a fish will be determined by 
their substantial being, or be an attribute of it; rather, based on a certain central feature or 
features which are defined through the method of division, and which will be specified by the 
order of the division, subsequent features can then be discovered.38 The exact same reasoning 
used on the fish case can also be employed on, for example, the claim that “some animals are 
blooded while some are bloodless” is “in the account defining their substantial being” (PA IV.5 
678a31-4). Once the conjunctive view of essences and the accompanying method of explanation 
is on the table, Aristotle’s views regarding the nature of this account look not only sensible but a 
logical extension of his earlier claims. 
                                                 
35 Οὐκ ἔχουσι δὲ ἀπηρτημένα κῶλα οἱ ἰχθύες, διὰ τὸ νευστικὴν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον, 
ἐπεὶ οὔτε περίεργον οὐδὲν οὔτε μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ. Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔναιμά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, διὰ μὲν τὸ νευστικὰ εἶναι 
πτερύγια ἔχει, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ πεζεύειν οὐκ ἔχει πόδας· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ποδῶν πρόσθεσις πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ πεδίῳ κίνησιν 
χρήσιμός ἐστιν. Ἅμα δὲ πτερύγια τέτταρα καὶ πόδας οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔχειν, οὐδ’ ἄλλο κῶλον τοιοῦτον οὐδέν· ἔναιμα γάρ. 
Οἱ δὲ κορδύλοι βράγχια ἔχοντες πόδας ἔχουσιν· 
36 Lennox 2003, 332 
37 Bronstein 2016 goes through the epistemic structure build on this edifice, which includes an account of empirical 
observation—I discover that this being is winged, and blooded, and since I have certain universal knowledge taken 
by observing things with this sort of being I make further hypotheses, leading to an account of further beings. I also 
know why, say, fish are a certain way in respects, and why they are not; for example, their method of laying eggs is 
not explained by their having fins or blood, but has a properly material or teleological explanation. 
38 Putting too much weight on this is complicated by Charles 2000, 333-334 
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I have argued that the PA and An. Prior accounts are in accord about what method of 
division is appropriate to use within an explanatory program that aims at scientific knowledge, 
and that they make good sense of a certain feature of Aristotle’s zoology, namely his use of 
explanation through substantial being. Problems remain, however, as to what the nature of 
substantial being exactly is, and the idea of a conjunctive essence poses a serious problem for the 
unity of essence within an Aristotelian species. For if all that an essence is composed of is a set, 
or even an ordered n-tuplet of attributes, then the boundaries between species begin to look 
porous, and even the light essentialist claim, that there is a certain something there is to being a 
member of a certain species, will be in jeopardy. To establish this, however, requires going 
through Aristotle’s psychology and metaphysics. 
IV. Substantial being and Soul 
Substantial being is not merely a concept which Aristotle uses as a biological and 
explanatory tool, but has deep roots in Aristotle’s metaphysics. Laying them out exhaustively 
would be to write a monograph on Aristotelian metaphysics; our interest is in how the 
metaphysics of substantial being provide a basis for Aristotle’s practices of explanation. Aristotle 
goes as far as to claim that at least one reason predecessors did not successfully give a causal 
account of natural beings “is that there was no ‘what it is to be’ and ‘defining substantial being’” 
(PA I.3 642a23-26)39. The focus on definition recalls our earlier discussion if the Posterior 
Analytics, but here substantial being does not only play an explanatory role (understanding why 
animals have the sorts of attributes they have), it is also contrasted as form with matter in the 
causal structure of animal beings. In fact, we will find that the causal structure of animals and 
their essences will turn out to be identical. Important to the overall metaphysical picture is also 
Aristotle’s development of the concept of soul in the Parts of Animals, as I will elaborate. One 
should “state that the animal is of such a kind, noting about each of its parts what it is and what 
sort of thing it is, just as one speaks of the form of the bed,” and further “suppose what one is 
thus speaking about is soul, or a part of soul, or is not without soul” (641a10-20). That is not to 
say that a biologist must be a psychologist, but that “it will be up to the natural philosopher to 
speak and know about the soul; and if not all of it, about that very part in virtue of which the 
                                                 
39 Rendering the Greek ὅτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὁρίσασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἦν. Lennox argues that the two phrases are 
“virtually synonymous,” since what it is for something to be defined as something simply is the substantial being of 
any given substance, as dicussed in Met. Zeta (Lennox 2002, 151). 
20 
 
animal is such as it is” (641a). After all, without a soul the animal simply cannot exist; but the 
point is deeper than that the soul is necessary for life. For the part of soul under consideration by 
the natural philosopher is intimately related to substantial being: 
[The natural philosopher] will state both what the soul or that very part of it is, and speak about 
the attributes it has in virtue of the sort of substantial being it is, especially since the nature of 
something is spoken of and is in two ways: as matter and as substantial being. And nature as 
substantial being is both nature as mover and nature as end. And it is the soul—either all of it or 
some part of it—that is such in the animal’s case40 (PA I.641a23-28). 
Quite a bit is packed into this one passage. Two sorts of explanations by nature are referenced, 
by nature, and substantial being, which I focus on. Aristotle does, however, seem to license here 
the explanatory pluralism I presume; the nature of something can be fruitfully spoken of via 
matter. Nevertheless, it is “requisite for the person studying nature to speak about soul more than 
the matter, inasmuch as it is more that the matter is nature because of the soul than the reverse” 
(641a32-35). Important for our purpose is that we get the abstract identification of the substantial 
being of an animal, or the “sort of substantial being it is,” along with that the nature of an animal 
as substantial being which is its soul. The description of “nature as substantial being” as “nature 
as mover and nature as end” recalls the definition of nature in Physics II, that “nature is the 
starting-point and cause of moving and being rest in that to which it belongs primarily in itself 
and not accidentally” (Physics II.1 192b20–25).41 I will not here, however, expand on the 
connection between the Physics passage and the Parts of Animals. Rather, over the course of this 
discussion I will first turn to the De Anima and further remarks about the functional organization 
of animals in the Parts of Animals, arguing that soul provides the ontological correlate for 
essences within natural science, before turning to the notion of substance more generally in 
Metaphysics Zeta. There are well known issues, however, with understanding the Zeta account of 
being alongside the Posterior Analytics account. I will not be able to address these issues here; 
my point will be rather that Aristotle has the resources to give an account of the substantial being 
of animals which allows for the complex explanatory structure in his mature account of division, 
in the Posterior Analytics, as previously discussed. 
                                                 
40 Κατ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καθ’ ὃ τοιοῦτο τὸ ζῷον, καὶ τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον, καὶ περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων 
κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αὐτῆς οὐσίαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς φύσεως διχῶς λεγομένης καὶ οὔσης τῆς μὲν ὡς ὕλης τῆς δ’ ὡς 
οὐσίας. Καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη καὶ ὡς ἡ κινοῦσα καὶ ὡς τὸ τέλος. Τοιοῦτον δὲ τοῦ ζῴου ἤτοι πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς. 
41 Rendering the Greek ὡς οὔσης τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρώτως 
καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. 
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To more fully understand, first, in what sense the soul of an animal can be its substantial 
being, we naturally should turn to Aristotle’s discussion of soul in the De Anima. There, too, the 
soul is equated with substance: 
It has now been said in general what the soul is: the soul is a substance corresponding to the account; 
and that is the essence of this sort of body. It is as if some tool were a natural body, e.g. an axe; in 
that case what it is to be an axe would be its substance, and this would also be its soul. If this were 
separated, it would no longer be an axe, aside from homonymously. But as things are, it is an axe. 
For the soul is not the essence and account of this sort of body, but rather of a certain sort of natural 
body, one having a source of motion and rest in itself42 (De Anima II.1 412b10-18).43 
To illustrate in what sense the soul is a substance, and can be the essence of an account, Aristotle 
uses the toy example of an axe. The soul is like the thing in virtue of which we can say that an 
axe is an axe. Of course, this is not to say that an axe has a soul (and indeed, like all artefacts its 
ontological status as substance is somewhat suspect), but merely that the soul is the ontological 
correlate of the “axeness” of the axe. Not only is the soul the substance in virtue of the 
possession of which any animal of a certain kind is of that kind; we learn that “substance is 
actuality,” this actuality being of a certain kind which is elaborated upon. (412a20-22). This is a 
reference to Aristotle’s metaphysics of actuality and potentiality. My argument in this paper will 
not lean heavily on the distinction between potentiality and actuality as developed in the central 
books of Aristotle’s metaphysics44. The point which I want to draw is that the soul has 
ontological primacy as the first actuality of a given body. Since “the soul will be an actuality of a 
body as such,” we should see it not only as what an animal of a given kind, but as a real principle 
of organization which makes the difference between a living being and inert matter. It fulfills the 
role of-for-the-sake-of-which that is described in the Parts of Animals: 
Since every instrument is for the sake of something, and each of the parts of the body is for the sake 
of a certain action, it is apparent that the entire body too has been constituted for the sake of a certain 
complete action. For sawing is not for the sake of the saw, but the saw for the sake of sawing; for 
sawing is a certain use. So the body too is in a way for the sake of the soul, and the parts are for the 
                                                 
42 Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, ὅτι οὐσία ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῳδὶ σώματι, 
ὥσπερ εἰ ἦν ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικὸν σῶμα, οἷον πρίων· ἦν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πρίονι εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ 
τοῦτο· διὸ ἀπελθούσης οὐκέτ’ ἂν ἦν πρίων, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὁμωνύμως. νῦν δ’ ἐστὶ πρίων· οὐ γὰρ τοιούτου σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ 
τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ τοιουδὶ ἔχοντος κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἀρχὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. 
43 Translation modified from Shields 2016 
44 For an account which primarily exploits this distinction see Lennox 2010 
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sake of the functions in relation to which each of them has naturally developed45 (PA I.5 645b15–
20). 
The relevance of the saw, that it is for a “complete action,” is explicable by reference to the De 
Anima doctrine of soul as the first actuality of a body. So each of the body parts is going to exist 
for the sake of the action of the soul. This might seem to be in tension with the obvious; prima 
facie, we might think that the function of a given part of an animal is its own task—that of an eye 
is to see, an ear to hear, and so on. Aristotle addresses this in De Anima, arguing that “if the eye 
were an animal, its soul would be sight, since that is the substance of the eye corresponding to 
the account,” but “what has been said in the case of the parts must of course be understood as 
applying to the entire living body” (DA II.1 412b15-25). The complete activity of the soul will be 
the unified activity of the animal.46 That is not to suggest that what is predicated of the 
substantial being can only be a certain activity; rather, the point is that conceptually, to speak of 
a part of an animal that it has in virtue of its substantial being is an essential function, and to say 
that without soul it is impossible to speak of an animal at all.  
V. Substantial Being in the Metaphysics 
Aristotle’s most in-depth analysis of the concepts of substantial being and definition 
come in difficult passages in Metaphysics Zeta. We learn more in it, however, as to how a 
definition should proceed in the case of the souls of animals given Aristotle’s hylomorphism: 
Now since the soul of animals (for this is substance of the animate) is the substance that is in accord 
with the account and is the form and the essence of such-and-such sort of body (certainly each part, 
if it is to be defined correctly, will not be defined without its function, which it could not have 
without perception), it follows that the parts of this are prior, either all or some, to the compound 
animal, and similarly, then, to each particular animal, whereas the body and its parts will be 
                                                 
45 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν ὄργανον πᾶν ἕνεκά του, τῶν δὲ τοῦ σώματος μορίων ἕκαστον ἕνεκά του, τὸ δ’ οὗ ἕνεκα πρᾶξίς τις, 
φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ σύνολον σῶμα συνέστηκε πράξεώς τινος ἕνεκα πολυμεροῦς. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ πρίσις τοῦ πρίονος χάριν 
γέγονεν, ἀλλ’ ὁ πρίων τῆς πρίσεως· χρῆσις γάρ τις ἡ πρίσις ἐστίν. Ὥστε καὶ τὸ σῶμά πως τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν, καὶ τὰ 
μόρια τῶν ἔργων πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον. Λεκτέον ἄρα πρῶτον τὰς πράξεις τάς τε κοινὰς πάντων καὶ τὰς κατὰ γένος 
καὶ τὰς κατ’ εἶδος. 
46 Lennox 2010, 6-8 argues further that the actions of an organism, their way of life or bios, is in fact what gives 
explanatory unity to an organism. 
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posterior, and what is divided into these as into matter is not the substance but the compound47 
(Metaphysics Ζ.11 1035b14-22).48 
This passage restates the connection between substance and the soul of a given animal, 
connecting it to form, the main candidate for substance in Zeta, and the essence of a given body, 
with parts defined, as set out above, with reference to the function of this soul and its account. 
What Aristotle asserts here, further, is that in terms of definition, that of the form of the animal—
its soul—is prior to the compound animal itself. It is not easy to understand what Aristotle means 
by priority, and glossing it is beyond my task here. I take it, however, in two ways. The first is 
that it is explanatory; we start from the essence of an animal, and from that we can employ 
various other subsidiary forms of explanation (e.g. teleological) in a secondary way. What it is 
for an animal to be of a certain form will then explain certain features that the entire compound 
has by virtue of its substantial being. The ontological priority claim is that what it is for an 
animal to be what it is (to use an Aristotelian phase) is its essence, and that this is at least in some 
respects prior to the entire form-matter compound. But we might hit a difficulty here—it is 
impossible to imagine what the essence of an animal might be without on some level being in 
matter (as in, for example, Aristotle’s embryology). Aristotle elsewhere in the Parts of Animals 
seems to ascribe substantial being both sorts of priorities, first in account: 
In generation things are opposed to the way they are in substantial being; for things posterior in 
generation are prior in nature, and the final stage in generation is prior in nature. For instance, a 
house is not for the sake of brick and stones, but rather these are for the sake of a house—and so it 
is with other matter. Not only is it apparent from a consideration of cases that this is the way things 
are, but it also accords with our account; for every generated thing develops from something and 
into something, i.e. from an origin to an origin, from the primary mover which already has a certain 
nature to a certain shape or other such end. For a human being generates a human being, and a plant 
a plant, from the underlying matter of each. So the matter and the generation are necessarily prior 
in time, but in account the substantial being and the shape of each thing. This would be clear if 
someone were to state the account of the generation of something; the account of housebuilding 
                                                 
47 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζῴων ψυχή (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ 
τοιῷδε σώματι (ἕκαστον γοῦν τὸ μέρος ἐὰν ὁρίζηται καλῶς, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου ὁριεῖται, ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἄνευ 
αἰσθήσεως), ὥστε τὰ ταύτης μέρη πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια τοῦ συνόλου ζῴου, καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον δὴ ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ 
σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου μόρια ὕστερα ταύτης τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ὡς εἰς ὕλην οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἀλλὰ τὸ 
σύνολον 
48 Translation Reeve 2016 
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includes that of house, while that of the house does not include that of housebuilding49 (PA II.1 
646a24-b4). 
We can only get a full explanation of what parts are by referring to the entirety that they are 
required to fulfill the function of, thereby giving priority in account as Aristotle describes, even 
though in time the parts come first. He also glosses a sort of priority for substantial being which 
is more clearly ontological: 
It seems we should begin, even with generation, precisely as we said before: first one should get 
hold of the phenomena concerning each kind, then state their cause. For even with house-building, 
it is rather that these things happen because the form of the house is such as it is, than that the house 
is such as it is because it comes to be in this way. For generation is for the sake of substantial being, 
rather than substantial being for the sake of generation. That is precisely why Empedocles misspoke 
when he said that many things are present in animals because of how things happened during 
generation—for example that the backbone is such as it is because it happened to get broken through 
being twisted he failed to understand, first, that seed already constituted with this sort of potential 
must be present, and second, that its producer was prior—not only in account but in time. For one 
human being generates another; consequently, it is on account of that one being such as it is that 
this one’s generation turns out a certain way50 (640a10-26). 
Although again generation is prior in time to the realization of a given substantial being, it is the 
causal role that substantial being plays that it is a generation towards a certain end. If the two 
sorts of priority seem to be almost identical, this is no accident; if substantial being had only 
explanatory or only ontological priority, it seems that the tight link Aristotle is at pains to 
maintain between explanatory and causal relations will be undone. There remain, however, 
further questions about equating definition, substantial being, and the soul. To think of the 
                                                 
49 Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐναντίως ἐπὶ τῆς γενέσεως ἔχει καὶ τῆς οὐσίας· τὰ γὰρ ὕστερα τῇ γενέσει πρότερα τὴν φύσιν ἐστί, καὶ 
πρῶτον τὸ τῇ γενέσει τελευταῖον· οὐ γὰρ οἰκία πλίνθων ἕνεκέν ἐστι καὶ λίθων, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα τῆς οἰκίας· ὁμοίως δὲ 
τοῦτ’ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὕλην. Οὐ μόνον δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ 
τὸν λόγον· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γινόμενον ἔκ τινος καὶ εἴς τι ποιεῖται τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἐπ’ ἀρχήν, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης 
κινούσης καὶ ἐχούσης ἤδη τινὰ φύσιν ἐπί τινα μορφὴν ἢ τοιοῦτον ἄλλο τέλος· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον καὶ φυτὸν 
γεννᾷ φυτὸν ἐκ τῆς περὶ ἕκαστον ὑποκειμένης ὕλης. Τῷ μὲν οὖν χρόνῳ προτέραν τὴν ὕλην ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὴν 
γένεσιν, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ἑκάστου μορφήν. Δῆλον δ’ ἂν λέγῃ τις τὸν λόγον τῆς γενέσεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ 
τῆς οἰκοδομήσεως λόγος ἔχει τὸν τῆς οἰκίας, ὁ δὲ τῆς οἰκίας οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῆς οἰκοδομήσεως. 
50 Δεῖ δὲ μὴ λεληθέναι καὶ πότερον προσήκει λέγειν, ὥσπερ οἱ πρότερον ἐποιοῦντο τὴν θεωρίαν, πῶς ἕκαστον 
γίγνεσθαι πέφυκε μᾶλλον ἢ πῶς ἔστιν. Οὐ γάρ τι μικρὸν διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐκείνου. Ἔοικε δ’ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρκτέον εἶναι, 
καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι πρῶτον τὰ φαινόμενα ληπτέον περὶ ἕκαστον γένος, εἶθ’ οὕτω τὰς αἰτίας τούτων 
λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως· μᾶλλον γὰρ τάδε συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκοδόμησιν, ἐπεὶ τοιόνδ’ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος τῆς 
οἰκίας, ἢ τοιόνδ’ ἐστὶν ἡ οἰκία, ὅτι γίνεται οὕτως. Ἡ γὰρ γένεσις ἕνεκα τῆς οὐσίας ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἕνεκα τῆς 
γενέσεως. Διόπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηκε λέγων ὑπάρχειν πολλὰ τοῖς ζῴοις διὰ τὸ συμβῆναι οὕτως ἐν τῇ 
γενέσει, οἷον καὶ τὴν ῥάχιν τοιαύτην ἔχειν, ὅτι στραφέντος καταχθῆναι συνέβη, ἀγνοῶν πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι δεῖ τὸ σπέρμα 
τὸ συνιστὰν ὑπάρχειν τοιαύτην ἔχον δύναμιν, εἶτα ὅτι τὸ ποιῆσαν πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν οὐ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ 
χρόνῳ· γεννᾷ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖνον τοιόνδ’ εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοιάδε συμβαίνει τῳδί. 
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essence of, for example, blood, without it being in any sort of matter sounds incoherent. But if 
we think of soul, as I have suggested, as a principle of functional organization which is realized 
in matter,  then we can understand how within Aristotle’s hylomorphism about the soul we might 
recognize this as prior to any real instantiation of it. What’s more, Aristotle recognizes that 
certain parts are in fact going to be of equal priority to the entire account. He claims that “some 
of these parts, however, are simultaneous, namely, the ones that are controlling and in which the 
account and the substance are first found—for example, the heart, perhaps, or the brain (for it 
makes no difference which of them is of this sort)” (10365b23-28). More than a remark on his 
developmental biology, the metaphysical significance of this remark is that the ontological 
correlate of an essence—whatever it is in reality that first corresponds to the “account and the 
substance” (and we might here remember that the soul is the first activation of the body—it is 
not something abstract, but always something real and efficacious) will be simultaneous with the 
essence. Blood might also turn out to be of this sort, as present within any organism from the 
beginning.51 
Aristotle introduces further considerations, however, about definition in light of his 
expanded metaphysical project; he will “speak—to the extent that we have not already discussed 
it in the Analytics—about definition” (Ζ.12 1038B5-10). He poses a certain aporia for himself: 
Now I mean this puzzle: why on earth is something one when the account of it is what we call a 
definition? For example, let the account of the human be the two-footed animal. Why, then, is this 
one and not instead many—animal and two-footed? For in the case of human and pale they are many 
when one does not belong to the other, but they are one when it does belong and the underlying 
subject, the human, has a certain attribute (for, then, one thing comes to be and we have the pale 
human). In the present case, by contrast, one does not participate in the other. For the genus does 
not seem to participate in the differentiae (in fact if it did the same thing would participate in 
contraries at the same time, since the differentiae that divide the genus are contraries). But even if 
it did participate, the argument would be the same, if indeed the differentiae are many—for example, 
footed, two-footed, featherless. Why are these one and not instead many? For it is not because they 
are present [in one genus], since that way there will be one from all. But surely the things in the 
definition must be one. For the definition is a certain account that is one and of substance, so that it 
                                                 
51 A problem related to those of definition I have brought up is how hylomorphic compounds of form and matter can 
themselves form a unity—for it seems that if we have an essence of some animal which is instantiated in matter which 
itself has properties, we now have a complex instead of a unity. Or we might have two essences; one “pure” form, and 
the other form in matter. A feature such as blood would seem to belong only to the latter, raising difficulties. But this 
is to assume that we have two things, form instantiated and “pure” form, which is manifestly not the case of an animal. 
A solution along the lines of  Gill 2010 will then complete this picture. 
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must be the account of one something. For the substance signifies one something and a this 
something as we say52 (Ζ.12 1037b10-28). 
The issue is related, but not identical to, the one we raised earlier about the unity of an essence 
for Aristotle. The issue there was how the multiplicity of differentia which compose animals are 
united, whereas here it is how, when there are multiple terms in a definition, they manage to 
compose a unity at all. The contrast is between the predication of a quality, such as pale, which 
does not form part of the definition, and “two-footed animal,” which form a unity. It is easy to 
see how a pale human is a unity; one is a quality predicated of a certain substance (speaking 
generally, not in the specific sense of substance developed in Zeta). But the mutual 
relationship—what is pale is human and human pale—which exists in the case of the pale person 
does not exist in the case of the differentia and genus, for the apparent reason that it is not strictly 
correct to say of what is animal participates in being two-footed—for it equally participates in 
what is not two-footed, since it covers all animals, but to have two incompatible attributes risks 
incoherence. But even this worry aside, Aristotle still poses a problem—there are multiple 
differentiae that we can see for a human being. What gives them their unity? It is not as though 
they are all predicated of the same genus—otherwise we again risk meaninglessness, since we 
are now putting every differentia into one genus. But the definition must be one, because of its 
tight connection with substance. Aristotle revisits division to solve the problem: 
We should first investigate definitions that are by division. For there is nothing else in the definition 
except the genus that is mentioned first and the differentiae; the other genera are in fact the first one 
along with the differentiae combined with it. The first, for example, may be animal, the next two-
footed animal, and next again featherless two-footed animal, and similarly if it is said by means of 
more differentiae. And in general it makes no difference whether it is said by means of many or of 
few—nor, therefore, whether by means of few or by means of just two. And of the two one is 
differentia and the other genus—for example, in the two-footed animal, the animal is genus and the 
other differentia. If, then, the genus is unconditionally nothing beyond the species as a species of a 
genus, or if it is, it is as matter (for the voiced sound is genus and matter, and the differentiae produce 
                                                 
52Λέγω δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν, διὰ τί ποτε ἕν ἐστιν οὗ τὸν λόγον ὁρισμὸν εἶναί φαμεν, οἷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον 
δίπουν· ἔστω γὰρ οὗτος αὐτοῦ λόγος. διὰ τί δὴ τοῦτο ἕν ἐστιν ἀλλ’ οὐ πολλά, ζῷον καὶ δίπουν· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ 
ἄνθρωπος καὶ λευκὸν πολλὰ μέν ἐστιν ὅταν μὴ ὑπάρχῃ θατέρῳ θάτερον, ἓν δὲ ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ καὶ πάθῃ τι τὸ 
ὑποκείμενον, ὁ ἄνθρωπος (τότε γὰρ ἓν γίγνεται καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος)· ἐνταῦθα δ’ οὐ μετέχει θατέρου 
θάτερον· τὸ γὰρ γένος οὐ δοκεῖ μετέχειν τῶν διαφορῶν (ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ αὐτὸ μετεῖχεν· αἱ γὰρ διαφοραὶ 
ἐναντίαι αἷς διαφέρει τὸ γένος). εἰ δὲ καὶ μετέχει, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, εἴπερ εἰσὶν αἱ διαφοραὶ πλείους, οἷον πεζὸν δίπουν 
ἄπτερον. διὰ τί γὰρ ταῦθ’ ἓν ἀλλ’ οὐ πολλά; οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ἐνυπάρχει· οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων ἔσται ἕν. δεῖ δέ γε ἓν 
εἶναι ὅσα ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ· ὁ γὰρ ὁρισμὸς λόγος τίς ἐστιν εἷς καὶ οὐσίας, ὥστε ἑνός τινος δεῖ αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον· καὶ 
γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἕν τι καὶ τόδε τι σημαίνει, ὡς φαμέν. 
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the phonetic element form these), then it is evident that the definition is the account composed of 
the differentiae53 (1037b28-1038a8). 
In this model of division, Aristotle proceeds by taking the most general differentia, such as 
animal, and then taking a differentia, such as two-footed, then a further one, such as featherless. 
So far this looks to be in accord with the procedure from the Posterior Analytics previously 
discussed. We have a certain genus at the most general level, that of animal, and we propose 
certain differentiations within it. The force of the account is on the differentiae, not the genus, 
which is taken as merely material for making further differentia. The work is being done not by 
knowing a human being is an animal, but in finding the major features which differentiate it from 
others and form certain biological commonalities. Previously, Aristotle had the problem of how 
we can find a genus large enough to contain all differentia; his first step, then, seems to be to 
point out that we can in the case of substances like living things find a broad level of description, 
plant or animal, to work from. He further specifies what is unique about this procedure: 
But in addition, the division should take the differentia of the differentia—for example, the footed 
is a differentia of animal, and next again we should know the differentia of the footed animal insofar 
as it is footed. So we should not say that of the footed there is on the one hand the feathered and on 
the other the featherless, if indeed we are to speak correctly (on the contrary, it is through lack of 
ability that we will say this), but rather that there is one the one hand the cloven-footed and on the 
other the not cloven-footed. For these are differentiae of foot. For the cloven-footed is a sort of 
footed. And we should try to proceed always in this way until we reach the undifferentiated. At that 
point there will be precisely as many species of foot as there are differentiae, and the footed animals 
will be equal in number to the differentiae54 (1038a8-18). 
Here, Aristotle claims that not only should we take what is predicated of a genus, but take the 
differentia of each differentia. The example is that we should not divide the footed into the 
feathered and featherless, but rather the differentiae of foot, and son, until we reach what can no 
                                                 
53 δεῖ δὲ ἐπισκοπεῖν πρῶτον περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς διαιρέσεις ὁρισμῶν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ πλὴν τὸ 
πρῶτον λεγόμενον γένος καὶ αἱ διαφοραί· τὰ δ’ ἄλλα γένη ἐστὶ τό τε πρῶτον καὶ μετὰ τούτου αἱ συλλαμβανόμεναι 
διαφοραί, οἷον τὸ πρῶτον ζῷον, τὸ δὲ ἐχόμενον ζῷον δίπουν, καὶ πάλιν ζῷον δίπουν ἄπτερον· ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν διὰ 
πλειόνων λέγηται. ὅλως δ’ οὐδὲν διαφέρει διὰ πολλῶν ἢ δι’ ὀλίγων λέγεσθαι, ὥστ’ οὐδὲ δι’ ὀλίγων ἢ διὰ δυοῖν· τοῖν 
δυοῖν δὲ τὸ μὲν διαφορὰ τὸ δὲ γένος, οἷον τοῦ ζῷον δίπουν τὸ μὲν ζῷον γένος διαφορὰ δὲ θάτερον. εἰ οὖν τὸ γένος 
ἁπλῶς μὴ ἔστι παρὰ τὰ ὡς γένους εἴδη, ἢ εἰ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὕλη δ’ ἐστίν (ἡ μὲν γὰρ φωνὴ γένος καὶ ὕλη, αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ 
τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐκ ταύτης ποιοῦσιν), φανερὸν ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ τῶν διαφορῶν λόγος.  
54ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ δεῖ γε διαιρεῖσθαι τῇ τῆς διαφορᾶς διαφορᾷ, οἷον ζῴου διαφορὰ τὸ ὑπόπουν· πάλιν τοῦ ζῴου τοῦ 
ὑπόποδος τὴν διαφορὰν δεῖ εἶναι ᾗ ὑπόπουν, ὥστ’ οὐ λεκτέον τοῦ ὑπόποδος τὸ μὲν πτερωτὸν τὸ δὲ ἄπτερον, ἐάνπερ 
λέγῃ καλῶς (ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀδυνατεῖν ποιήσει τοῦτο), ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ μὲν σχιζόπουν τὸ δ’ ἄσχιστον· αὗται γὰρ διαφοραὶ 
ποδός· ἡ γὰρ σχιζοποδία ποδότης τις. καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ βούλεται βαδίζειν ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὰ ἀδιάφορα· τότε δ’ ἔσονται 
τοσαῦτα εἴδη ποδὸς ὅσαιπερ αἱ διαφοραί, καὶ τὰ ὑπόποδα ζῷα ἴσα ταῖς διαφοραῖς. 
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longer be differentiated. But this seems to be plainly in conflict with what we said earlier, and to 
return to the model rejected in the Parts of Animals on which we divide one attribute until we 
reach the ultimate end, which will turn out to be the substance of the animal.55 With what 
follows, however, an alternative picture can at least be sketched out: 
If, then, this is how thing stand, it is evident that the ultimate differentia will be the substance of the 
thing and its definition, if indeed we should not state the same thing many times in the definitions, 
since that would be wasted work. And this is certainly what does happen. For when we say two-
footed footed animal we have said nothing other than animal with feet with two feet. And if we 
divide this too by a proper division, we shall be saying the same thing several times over—as many 
times as there are differentiae. If, then, we take a differentia of a differentia, one differentia—the 
ultimate one—will be the form and the substance. But if we divide coincidentally—for example, if 
the footed were divided into the pale and the dark—there will be as many differentiae as there are 
cuts. Thus it is evident that the definition is the account composed of the differentiae, or, if it is in 
accord with the correct procedure, the ultimate one. This would be clear if we were to change the 
order in such definitions—for example, in that of the human, saying footed two-footed animal. For 
it is wasted work to say footed when two-footed has been said. And there is no order in the substance, 
since how could we understand one thing as being prior and another posterior?56 (1038b18-34). 
Although he Aristotle uses having two feet as a toy example, I think we may surmise that 
Aristotle does not assume we can divide, for example, footed-ness in such a way that we will end 
up at one, ultimate differentia of a given animal species, however useful it is as a toy example. 
We should not take its use in metaphysical agenda-setting example here as indicating a deep 
truth about natural philosophy. Besides these considerations, the quest of finding precisely as 
many differentiae of feet as there are animals is represented as merely a way we “try to proceed,” 
not as indicative of successful biological practice57. But, turning to address a deeper problem, we 
                                                 
55 Bostock 1994, 182-184 takes this line. He argues that this very passage is what Aristotle has in mind to criticize in 
PA, instead embracing a picture like the one traced earlier, on which there are multiple lines of differentiation. Bostock 
argues from this that this passage must antedate Aristotle’s serious biological work. Lloyd 1991, 379-381 similarly 
suggests that either animals, as described in Aristotle’s zoology, must fail the test of substantiality or this picture must 
be radically revised. 
56 εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ τελευταία διαφορὰ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος ἔσται καὶ ὁ ὁρισμός, εἴπερ μὴ δεῖ 
πολλάκις ταὐτὰ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς ὅροις· περίεργον γάρ. συμβαίνει δέ γε τοῦτο· ὅταν γὰρ εἴπῃ ζῷον ὑπόπουν δίπουν, 
οὐδὲν ἄλλο εἴρηκεν ἢ ζῷον πόδας ἔχον, δύο πόδας ἔχον· κἂν τοῦτο διαιρῇ τῇ οἰκείᾳ διαιρέσει, πλεονάκις ἐρεῖ καὶ 
ἰσάκις ταῖς διαφοραῖς. ἐὰν μὲν δὴ διαφορᾶς διαφορὰ γίγνηται, μία ἔσται ἡ τελευταία τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ οὐσία· ἐὰν δὲ κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ διαιροῖ τοῦ ὑπόποδος τὸ μὲν λευκὸν τὸ δὲ μέλαν, τοσαῦται ὅσαι ἂν αἱ τομαὶ ὦσιν. ὥστε φανερὸν 
ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐκ τῶν διαφορῶν, καὶ τούτων τῆς τελευταίας κατά γε τὸ ὀρθόν. δῆλον δ’ ἂν εἴη, εἴ τις 
μετατάξειε τοὺς τοιούτους ὁρισμούς, οἷον τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, λέγων ζῷον δίπουν ὑπόπουν· περίεργον γὰρ τὸ ὑπόπουν 
εἰρημένου τοῦ δίποδος. τάξις δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ· πῶς γὰρ δεῖ νοῆσαι τὸ μὲν ὕστερον τὸ δὲ πρότερον; 
57 Aristotle seems to suggest something much like this in his critique of dichotomizing division in the Parts of Animals 
discussed in chapter II. A difference like “two-footed” may end up being the last differentia in a dichotomizing 
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have already learned that the substance of an animal will turn out to be its soul; therefore, our 
division must ultimately arrive at something that is the soul of a given animal. But we do not 
have the means to find the essence of a given animal directly, without painstaking biological 
work; the simplified model of Zeta is incapable of accounting for the difficulties the empirically 
minded zoologist will come across, and Aristotle’s own science of soul addresses it in general, 
not in the particular mode required (indeed, the fundamental tension here should not be taken to 
be between two accounts of division, but between a view of the soul as universal and common 
to, in three broad categories, all animals, and as the substantial being of an animal). That aside, 
what we can take from these two passages is the importance of differentiae for determining 
substantiality. Just as we have seen in the Parts of Animals, Aristotle uses a criterion of 
parsimony—not including extraneous material within the essence of a given substance. Rather 
than listing the entire genus-differentiae complex, as in an animal with two feet, that has feet, 
that is an animal, Aristotle notes that when it is possible to take another differentia of a given 
differentia (or the genus we begin with), taking the last differentia always presupposes the 
previous ones. By taking the last differentia, we can arrive at what features of the animal it has in 
virtue of its substantial being. In the idealized Zeta account, this comes down to one feature, but 
in the non-idealized conditions of empirical work, as I have argued we point out several features. 
The tension this raises is how this fits in with Aristotle’s picture of simplicity. This raises an 
issue, however; essence in Zeta must be simple but I have argued that definition in the Posterior 
Analytics have a certain structure. The first response is to rely on the picture of soul I have just 
drawn, on which we are imperfectly attempting to track soul, which is fundamentally simple. But 
even on its own merits, I think we can defend the sort of definitions we find in the Posterior 
Analytics.  The Posterior Analytics method of division, as I have argued is interested in 
explanations at the general level, for which it is useful to include common features which do not 
nevertheless cut close to the substance of a given animal. By including these larger genera, the 
method of division makes clear interconnections between various animals. This does, however, 
introduce a level of complexity to a Posterior Analytics division, as certain differentiae are 
lower-level than higher genera. Zeta achieves simplicity in essences by eliding those higher 
genera, leaving only the ultimate ones which demarcate it. But as long as in both cases the same 
                                                 
division, but it is not the final difference, which is the form. This remark seems, furthermore, to posit a difference 
between Academic dichotomizing and the Zeta methodology. 
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bottom-level essences are arrived at, then using concept, that of essence, for two ends seems to 
be, if messy, not critically dangerous to Aristotle’s project. And it seems that this is so; for if the 
final differentia is the ultimate substance and essence in Zeta, and in Posterior Analytics we find 
an extended definition with some internal structure that is elided in the Metaphysics procedure, 
then we have reached two different ways of explaining the very same essence—one in terms of 
shared features, the other in terms of that which is found when these shared features run out. 
Two lessons can be drawn, then, from our quick stop in Zeta. We have found some evidence for 
thinking that, for animals, no one given differentia is the ultimate differentia and thus the 
essence, but rather the form of the animal itself, which is the soul, thus preempting an 
unequivocally negative conclusion on the relation between Zeta and the zoology. There remains 
a question, however, about the relationship of the whole function, as in the soul, to the parts of a 
given animal. 
VI. Parts and Wholes in the Biology 
Moving to the final part of my argument, we must understand first the relation of parts of 
an animal to its substantial being, and then how the explanatory concept of substantial being is 
actually deployed in the Parts of Animals. First, however, we will turn to the Politics, in which 
Aristotle unveils a doctrine about the parts of animals while making analogy to different 
constitutions: 
Now if we wanted to grasp the kinds of animals, we would first determine what it is that every 
animal must have, for example, some of the sense-organs, something with which to masticate and 
absorb food, such as a mouth and a stomach, and in addition to these parts by which each of them 
moves. If, then, there were only this many parts, but there were differences in them (I mean, for 
example, if there were several kinds of mouths, stomachs, and sense-organs, and further also of parts 
for movement), then the number of ways of combining these will necessarily produce several kinds 
of animals. For the same animal cannot have many different sorts of mouth, nor of ears either. So, 
when all the possible ways of coupling them have been grasped, they will produce kinds of animals, 
and as many kinds as there are combinations of the necessary parts58 (Politics IV.4 1290b25-40)59. 
                                                 
58 ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῴου προῃρούμεθα λαβεῖν εἴδη, πρῶτον ἂν ἀποδιωρίζομεν ἅπερ ἀναγκαῖον πᾶν ἔχειν ζῷον (οἷον ἔνιά 
τε τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἐργαστικὸν καὶ δεκτικόν, οἷον στόμα καὶ κοιλίαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἷς κινεῖται 
μορίοις ἕκαστον αὐτῶν)· εἰ δὴ τοσαῦτα εἴη μόνον, τούτων δ’ εἶεν διαφοραί (λέγω δ’ οἷον στόματός τινα πλείω γένη 
καὶ κοιλίας καὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν κινητικῶν μορίων), ὁ τῆς συζεύξεως τῆς τούτων ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
ποιήσει πλείω γένη ζῴων (οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ταὐτὸν ζῷον ἔχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ’ ὤτων), ὥσθ’ 
ὅταν ληφθῶσι τούτων πάντες οἱ ἐνδεχόμενοι συνδυασμοί, ποιήσουσιν εἴδη ζῴου, καὶ τοσαῦτ’ εἴδη τοῦ ζῴου ὅσαι περ 
αἱ συζεύξεις τῶν ἀναγκαίων μορίων εἰσίν. 
59 Translations of Politics from Reeve 2017 
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While some want to dismiss this passage as irrelevant to real natural science, it has something 
interesting to say about Aristotle’s biological thought.60 For according to the methodology, every 
animal has a series of “necessary” parts61. From the examples given, these are the parts that 
fulfill all of the functions of the animal—seeing, working, absorbing food, and so on. All of these 
in different configurations will allow us to grasp kinds of animals. This is of course a vague 
sketch; Aristotle presumably does not mean for any imaginary combinations of parts that we 
might dream up, we can thereby identify a certain actually existing species. This is a serious 
challenge, however, to an account on which the entire soul, not individual parts, are the 
substance of an animal. There is something intuitively missing about this picture, however, and it 
stems from the use of “necessity” here. Aristotle’s use of necessity in biology can be roughly 
divided into three kinds, unqualified, material, and conditional.62 The first two refer to the 
behavior of matter, so are clearly irrelevant here, leaving conditional necessity. Roughly, 
conditional necessity is necessity given another outcome. So to speak of necessary parts in this 
way, there must be a certain end which is achieved by them. As much is stated by Aristotle: 
Hence it would be best to say that, since this is what it is to be a human being, on account of this it 
has these things; for it cannot be without these parts. If one cannot say this, one should say the next 
best thing, i.e. either that in general it cannot be otherwise, or that at least it is good thus. And these 
things follow. And since it is such, its generation naturally happens in this way and is such as it is. 
(This is why this part comes to be first, then that one.) And in like manner one should speak in 
precisely this way about all the things constituted by nature63 (640a35-640b4). 
                                                 
60 While it is true that the results of political science may have little or nothing to do with biology, we should make a 
distinction between a claim in political science and the claim made in the treatise entitled the Politics. Aristotle is 
perfectly willing to employ, for the sake of an example, a biological principle—and one which we may then utilize. 
Pellegrin 1985, 101-103 most forcefully that this passage corresponds to nothing in the biological works, and should 
thereby be discarded as only meant to be an analogy with constitutions. But even if the methodology is inappropriate 
to biological sciences (since we proceed by looking at actual organisms, not conceptually, there is an interesting 
question of why this methodology is incompatible with the biology or whether it, contra Pellegrin, maps onto a real 
way of proceeding. But Pellegrin’s hypothesis itself faces issues; it is difficult to see how Aristotle would be making 
the political arts clearer by means of an analogy with biology if the latter had no basis in fact whatsoever. 
61 Aristotle also says that this will allow us to λαβεῖν εἴδη, to grasp the form, but we should not take this to mean that 
the form of an animal is equivalent to a series of parts; rather, as I will sketch out, it will give us an understanding of 
the animal which will indirectly point towards the form of the animal, which is its functional organization or soul. 
Taking it in a specifically metaphysical sense makes it plainly incompatible with both Aristotle’s metaphysicsp as 
sketched elsewhere as well as his biological praxis. 
62 After Leunissen 2011, 100-103 
63 Διὸ μάλιστα μὲν λεκτέον ὡς ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ’ ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτ’ ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ 
τῶν μορίων τούτων. Εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτου, καὶ ἢ ὅλως (ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἄλλως) ἢ καλῶς γε οὕτως. Ταῦτα δ’ 
ἕπεται. Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τὴν γένεσιν ὡδὶ καὶ τοιαύτην συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον. Διὸ γίνεται πρῶτον τῶν μορίων 
τόδε, εἶτα τόδε. Καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν φύσει συνισταμένων. 
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The necessary parts are directly tied to those necessary for someone to be a human being, though 
they themselves do not serve as parts of substantial being. But to speak of a sort of functional 
organization is to invoke functions, and since we are talking about animals, to thereby invoke 
soul. What’s more, while the passage does talk only of parts, not their unity, when discovering 
the kinds of animals, the background picture Aristotle has guarantees that parts are ontologically 
secondary in nature. As Aristotle says even in the Politics, “it is necessary for the whole to be 
prior to the part. For if the whole body is put to death, there will no longer be a foot or a hand, 
except homonymously, as one might speak of a stone ‘hand’ (for, once dead, the hand will be 
like that). For everything is defined by its function and by its capacity” (Politics I.2 1253a18-25). 
This discovery is confirmed by a remark in the Metaphysics, that “bodily parts, then, are in a way 
prior to the compound, but in a way not, since they cannot exist when they are separated. For it is 
not a finger in any and every state that is the finger of an animal; rather, a dead finger is only 
homonymously a finger” (Metaphysics Ζ.11 1035b22-25). To speak of the part of an animal is 
then only to speak of it in conjunction with other parts as actual, that is, in an ensouled, living 
organism. We can illustrate the tight relationship between the necessary parts of an animal and 
their substantial being through a simple illustration, that of the octopus: 
Now while the other octopuses have two rows of suckers, one kind of octopus has a single row. This 
is because of the length and thinness of their nature; for it is necessary that the narrow tentacle 
should have a single row of suckers. It is not, then, because it is best that they have this feature, but 
because it is necessary owing to the distinctive account of their substantial being64 (PA IV.9 685b12-
18). 
What is being explained here is a particular part of this octopus—that is has only one row of 
suckers. This is a particular characteristic of the octopus, but it is itself not claimed to be part of 
its substantial being. What is in fact ascribed to the substantial being of this kind of octopus is 
the “length and thinness of their nature.”65 Apparently, a particular differentia of this sort of 
octopus, what makes it distinct from other sorts, is that very length and thinness. Since we have 
learnt that the best candidates for the substantial being are these ultimate differentia (and, in the 
Zeta fashion, the genus that is being divided to result in “length and thinness” is elided), and that 
the length and thinness are how this octopus has been divided from the others, the explanation is 
                                                 
64 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα δικότυλά ἐστι, γένος δέ τι πολυπόδων μονοκότυλον. αἴτιον δὲ τὸ μῆκος καὶ ἡ λεπτότης τῆς φύσεως 
αὐτῶν‧  μονοκότυλον γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ στενόν. οὐκ οὖν ὡς βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὸν ἴδιον 
λόγον τῆς οὐσίας 
65Rendering τὸ μῆκος καὶ ἡ λεπτότης τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν. 
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on the level of substantial being. The relation between the part and the whole octopus is exactly 
that of the pattern earlier described in the Parts of Animals. Aristotle seems to be saying here that 
it would be impossible for an animal as long and thin as the octopus of this sort to have two rows 
of tentacle, but at the same time to be an octopus, whatever sort of substantial being that turns 
out to be, it must have suckers; therefore, it is necessary that it has this very kind. 
There are a few choice examples of Aristotle explicitly appealing to the substance of an 
animal for explanatory purposes, as in this example regarding birds: 
They are two-footed of necessity; for the substantial being of the bird is that of the blooded animals, 
but at the same time that of the winged animals, and blooded animals do not move by more than 
four points. Accordingly, the attached parts are four—as in the other locomotive land-movers, so 
too in the birds. But four arms and legs are present in the one group, while in the birds, instead of 
forelimbs or arms, wings are a common feature; and in virtue of these they are able to stretch out, 
and the ability to fly is in the substantial being of the bird66 (PA IV.12 693b5-15). 
This follows the same pattern of explanation seen in the fish example earlier used in the 
Posterior Analytics. A common feature is listed, at the level of maximal specificity (which 
happens to be very general, in this case), namely blood. But we also reach that of the winged 
animals. The wings are part of their substantial being as well, as a general attribute, but it is fit 
for the level of generality, not a specific animal but of a bird. But by looking at essential 
biological traits and a functional principle, that the bird can fly, we arrive at a specific essence of 
the bird which can differentiate it from other sorts of animals. Thereby, through Aristotle’s 
procedure as described, we are justified in ascribing the specific features to the animal’s 
substantial being. Another example, however, seems to confound our expectations: 
Generally then, the lung is for the sake of breathing, while it is bloodless and of such a kind for the 
sake of certain animals. But what is common to these animals is nameless; that is, no name has bene 
applied them as the name ‘bird’ has bene applied to a certain kind of animal. For this reason, just as 
being for a bird is 67 (PA III.6 669b-12). 
                                                 
66 δίπουν δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν‧  τῶν γὰρ ἐναίμων ἡ τοῦ ὄρνιθος οὐσία, ἅμα δὲ καὶ πτερυγωτός. τὰ δ’ ἔναιμα οὐ κινεῖται 
πλείοσιν ἢ τέτταρσι σημείοις. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀπηρτημένα μόρια, τέτταρα, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πεζοῖς καὶ τοῖς 
πορευτικοῖς, ἔστι καὶ τοῖς ὄρνισιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν βραχίονες καὶ σκέλη, τοίς δέ τετράποσι* σκέλη τέτταρα ὑπάρχει, 
τοῖς δ’ ὄρνισιν ἀντὶ τῶν προσθίων σκελῶν ἢ βραχιόνων πτερύγιον κοινόν ἐστιν κατὰ ταύτας γὰρ τονικοί εἰσι, τῷ δ’ 
ὄρνιθιἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ πτητικόνἐστιν 
67 ὅλως μὲν οὖν ὁ πλεύμων ἐστὶν ἀναπνοῆς χάριν, ἄναιμος δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτος γένους τινὸς ἕνεκεν ζῴων‧  ἀλλ’ ἀνώνυμον 
τὸ κοινὸν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ὁ ὄρνις ὠνόμασται ἐπί τινος γένους. διὸ ὥσπερ τὸ ὄρνιθι εἶναι ἔκ τινός ἐστι, καὶ 
ἐκείνων ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὑπάρχει τὸ πλεύμονα ἔχειν. 
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What makes this passage peculiarly difficult is that Aristotle seems to put a particular part, 
having a lung, in the substantial being of an animal. But this would be too hasty; Aristotle is not 
saying that the lung itself is part of the substantial being of an animal, but that there is a yet 
unnamed property which necessarily has the part of a lung. The comparison with birds is 
instructive; it is not that the wing of a bird is in the substantial being, but that a certain property, 
wingedness, πτερυγωτός, a coinage of Aristotle, is present. Aristotle is trying to pick out a 
similar property for the property which requires a lung, but lacks the vocabulary to do so. What’s 
more, as Gotthelf points out, we can identify a functional role for lungedness; “The issue is 
complicated by the fact that the possession of a lung, stated to be present in the ousia of all 
animals that have one, is itself explained by reference to the lung's respiratory (i.e., cooling) 
function, a function which is needed by virtue of these animals’ unusually hot nature.”68 
Lungedness will turn out then to be a functional term. The issue Gotthelf raises is that if we are 
keeping essences as thin as possible, putting only in them what is required to get the functional 
organization of an animal (its soul), then this looks unnecessary. But the property of having a 
lung might turn out to be like blood; although we might a priori think it is superfluous in 
substantial being, when we consider that animals are form-matter compounds, we might be 
surprised to discover certain necessary formal features of an animal that are necessitated because 
of facts about matter. In order for the remainder of the features in the substantial being of a 
lunged animal to come about, given the matter we find in the world it would necessarily 
overheat, unless lungs were present to perform a cooling function. This is not to say that matter 
enters into the form, but merely that the hylomorphic structure of an animal may lead to 
additional necessary functions, in this case cooling. There is another problem, however, 
stemming from Aristotle’s explanation of analogy within division: 
It is necessary first to divide the attributes associated with each kind that belong in themselves to all 
the animals, and next to try to divide their causes. Now it has been said before that many common 
features belong to many of the animals, some without qualification (such as feet, wings, and scales, 
and affectations too in the same way), and other analogously. By analogously I mean that, while 
some have a lung, other have, not a lung, but instead something different which is to them what a 
                                                 
68 Gotthelf 2012, 238 
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lung is to those that have one; and some have blood, while others have its analogue, with the same 
potential that blood has for the blooded69 (PA I.5 645b1-10). 
The complex model of division previously developed helps us to understand how Aristotle will 
proceed by dividing through common features, but what Aristotle says about dividing 
analogously proves difficult. His claim is that some animals have lungs but others have, instead 
of lungs, “something different which is to them what a lung is to those that have one,” and so on 
with lungs—both, as we have seen, paradigm cases of features in the substantial being of a given 
animal. But if analogy is defined through the function of parts such as lungs and blood, and if 
lung and its counterpart or blood and its counterpart fulfill the same functional role, then there 
will be, from the perspective of functional organization, no way of distinguishing between lungs 
and not-lungs except by bringing in other features, such as matter. But the difference in 
substantial being is supposed to be entirely formal—thus generating a vicious paradox. We can 
define a lung formally by reference to functional organization without fulfilling a part, but we 
can only separate between lungs and not-lungs by reference to anything but functional 
organization, apparently. A way out, however, seems to be provided by Aristotle. The function 
of a lung is not independent, but embedded within the extremely complex structure of any living 
animal. It is at least plausible that a lung plays a function similar to a lung-analogous part, but 
not quite the same given the entirely different internal organization of the sort of animal which 
has a lung and that which has a lung-analogue, and so on with the various parts of a division. 
One upshot of this picture is that it would show the interwoven nature of animals even with 
conjunctive definitions; since every single feature within the substantial being must fit together 
to build a functioning whole, animals possess an essential unity70.  
VII. Conclusion 
The account of substantial being I have argued for functions as a sketch for an 
Aristotelian research project which is never quite brought to fruition; the texts in which this sort 
of explanation is actually put to use are frustratingly scarce, yet I am confident that this picture 
                                                 
69 Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ πρῶτον τὰ συμβεβηκότα διελεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον γένος, ὅσα καθ’ αὑτὰ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, μετὰ 
δὲ ταῦτα τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν πειρᾶσθαι διελεῖν. Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον ὅτι πολλὰ κοινὰ πολλοῖς ὑπάρχει τῶν 
ζῴων, τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς, οἷον πόδες πτερὰ λεπίδες, καὶ πάθη δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τούτοις, τὰ δ’ ἀνάλογον. Λέγω δ’ 
ἀνάλογον, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει πλεύμων, τοῖς δὲ πλεύμων μὲν οὔ, ὃ δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσι πλεύμονα, ἐκείνοις ἕτερον ἀντὶ 
τούτου· καὶ τοῖς μὲν αἷμα, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἀνάλογον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν ἥνπερ τοῖς ἐναίμοις τὸ αἷμα. 
70 It became apparent to me after writing this essay that a very similar answer was first proposed to the problem of 
unity by Gill 1993. 
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gets something essentially right about Aristotle’s scientific practice and his metaphysics. What 
we end up with is an essentialism of a kind, but it is a thin kind of essentialism—the bare 
minimum necessary to ensure that a thing is what it is lies in the essence, and as much as 
possible is left to be derived from that essence through the various explanatory schemata 
Aristotle utilizes. We will find these essences only, it seems, after much empirical work, and 
they will play a diminished role compared to other methods—which may well explain the 
scarcity of examples where Aristotle uses explanation by substantial being. Good history of 
philosophy often makes us reflect on our own philosophical situation and what our philosophical 
predecessors can impart to us; this is less the case when studying ancient science, nor has this 
been the sort of paper which attempts to take classical thought and apply it to a contemporary 
program. Nonetheless, perhaps the conceptual space Aristotle opens for a middle ground 
between essentialists and anti-essentialist in philosophy broadly construed is still fertile, 
whatever the substitute for an ancient and outdated, though fascinating, biology might be. 
  
37 
 
Bibliography 
Aristotle (trans. Lennox, James). On the Parts of Animals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003. 
Aristotle (trans. Barnes, Jonathan) Posterior Analytics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Aristotle (trans. Bostock, David) Metaphysics Z and H. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Aristotle (trans. Reeve, C.D.C), Metaphysics. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2016. 
Aristotle (trans. Reeve, C.D.C.), Politics: A New Translation. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2017. 
Bronstein, David. Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Burnyeat, Myles, “Aristotle on the Foundations of Sublunary Physics,” in Aristotle: On 
Generation and Corruption Symposium Aristotelicum ed. De Haas and Mansfeld, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004: 7-24. 
Charles, David, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Devin, Henry. "The Birds and the Bees: Aristotle on the Biological Concept of Analogy" 
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Vol. 29.1, 2014. 
Gill, Mary Louise. “Comments on Charles.” Proceedigns of the Boston Area Coloquium in 
Ancient Philosophy 7, 1993. 
Gill, Mary Louise. “Unity of definition in Metaphysics Η.6 and Ζ.12,” in Being, Nature, and Life 
in Aristotle (ed. Gotthelf and Bolton). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Gotthelf, Allan. Teleology, First Principles, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Biology. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Lennox, James. Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Science. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.  
Lennox, James. “Bios and Explanatory Unity in Aristotle’s Biology” in Definition in Greek 
Philosophy (ed. Charles). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Leunissen, Mariska. Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Study of Nature. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Lloyd, Geoffrey. “Aristotle’s Zoology and his Metaphysics: The Status Quaestionis,” in Methods 
and Problems in Greek Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
Lloyd, Geoffrey. “Fuzzy Natures,” in Aristotelian Explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996a. 
38 
 
Lloyd, Geoffrey. “The Theories and Practices of Demonstration,” in Aristotelian Explorations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996b. 
Pellegrin, Pierre. “Aristotle: A Zoology Without Species” in Aristotle on Nature and Living 
Things (ed. Gotthelf and Lennox). Mathesis Publications, 1985. 
Reeve. C.D.C. Substantial Knowledge. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000. 
 
